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INTRODUCTION

On February 21, 2017, one month and one day after the
inauguration of Donald Trump as the forty-fifth President of the
United States, the Washington Post debuted a new slogan:
“Democracy Dies in Darkness.”1 This phrase draws on our country’s
tradition of recognizing the importance of a free and open press,2
but is it still true? In today’s world, does the media still play a
fundamental role as a check on our government? Furthermore, in
areas like immigration law, where considerable power and deference
lies with the President and Department of Homeland Security, what
1. Joe Concha, The Washington Post: ‘Democracy Dies in Darkness’, THE HILL
(Feb. 22, 2017, 11:12 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/media/320619-thewashington-post-democracy-dies-in-darkness [https://perma.cc/GUR2-5EE4]; see
Paul Farhi, The Washington Post’s New Slogan Turns out to be an Old Saying,
WASH. POST. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/
the-washington-posts-new-slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199
cda-fa02-11e6-be05-la3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.d2c3e3126027 [https://
perma.cc/ QM8Q-UWUX].
2. See Stephen J. Shapiro, One and the Same: How Internet Non-Regulation
Undermines the Rationales Used to Support Broadcast Regulation, 8 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 2
(1999).

2018]

THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY 805

is the role of the “Fourth Estate” in holding governmental
institutions accountable?
This article examines these questions by analyzing the role of
the press in shaping immigration policy by the Obama and Trump
Administrations with respect to two groups: Central American
asylum seekers—particularly unaccompanied minors and family
units—and Syrian refugees. The article first examines how press
coverage and public engagement served as a check on the Obama
Administration and shaped President Obama’s response to the
Central American Migrant Crisis and Syrian Refugee Crisis during
his second term.3 The article then describes executive actions taken
by the Trump Administration that adversely impacted Central
American asylum seekers and Syrian refugees, and analyzes how
media coverage shaped the Trump Administration’s ability to
implement policies against these groups.4
II. TWO HUMANITARIAN CALAMITIES: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRANT
CRISIS AND SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS
In his second term, President Obama faced two humanitarian
emergencies: the Central American Migrant Crisis and the Syrian
Refugee Crisis. There were a number of external factors that
influenced the Obama Administration’s response to these events,
the most obvious being the proximity of the Central American
Migrant Crisis at the southern border. The available data suggests
that media coverage did play a role in President Obama’s response.
A.

Central American Migrant Crisis

In the summer of 2014, the Obama Administration faced a crisis
along the southern border.5 While the total number of illegal
crossings remained historically low,6 the spring and summer of 2014
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Richard Cowan, Waves of Immigrant Minors Present Crisis for Obama,
Congress, REUTERS (May 28, 2014, 8:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-immigration-children/waves-of-immigrant-minors-present-crisis-for-obama-con
gress-idUSKBN0E814T20140528 [https://perma.cc/3MJE-XCS5] (“Tens of
thousands of children unaccompanied by parents or relatives are flooding across
the southern U.S. border illegally, forcing the Obama administration and Congress
to grapple with both a humanitarian crisis and a budget dilemma.”).
6. The total number of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehensions
at the southern border in FY 2014, typically used as an indicator of the total number
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saw a surge of unaccompanied minors and family units with children
from Central America apprehended at the border.7
For President Obama—who was hoping to pass comprehensive
immigration reform or, at minimum, use executive action to expand
protections for undocumented immigrants through the Deferred
Action for Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) program8—this crisis could not have happened at a worse
time.9 With midterm elections only a few months away, the Obama
of illegal crossings, was 479,371, on par with the historically low number
of apprehensions since FY 2010. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. BORDER PATROL TOTAL MONTHLY APPREHENSIONS (FY 2000–
FY 2017) (Dec. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/
2017Dec/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Area%
2C%20FY2000-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RS9-A36H].
7. In the third quarter of FY 2014 (April–June 2014), CBP apprehended a
total of 35,563 individuals traveling as family units (often women with
small children) and 28,904 unaccompanied minors. See U.S. CUSTOMS &
BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. BORDER PATROL TOTAL
MONTHLY FAMILY UNIT APPREHENSIONS BY SECTOR (FY 2013 - FY 2017)
(Dec. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2016
Oct/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Family%20Units%20by%20Sector%2C%20FY1
3-FY16.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEN3-92RE]; see also Press Release, Jeh Johnson,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement About Situation Along the Southern
Border (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/09/08/statementsecretary-johnson-about-situation-along-southwest-border [https://perma.cc/4XH
9-APRD].
8. On November 20, 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a
memorandum directing DHS to extend deferred action protections to parents of
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who continuously resided in the U.S.
since January 1, 2010, in a program known as DAPA. See Memorandum from Jeh
Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. et al. 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.
cc/R5JZ-DT64]. The memorandum also expanded protections under the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. See id. at 3–4.
9. In an interview on NBC’s Meet the Press on September 7, 2014, when
questioned on his decision to delay any executive action on immigration until after
the midterm elections, President Obama acknowledged that the Central American
Migrant Crisis made it difficult, politically, to move forward with these planned
measures, stating:
Not only do I want to make sure that the T’s are crossed and the I’s are
dotted, but here’s the other thing, Chuck, and I’m being honest now,
about the politics of it. This problem with unaccompanied children that
we saw a couple weeks ago, where you had from Central America a surge
of kids who are showing up at the border, got a lot of attention. And a
lot of Americans started thinking, “We’ve got this immigration crisis on
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Administration made the pragmatic decision to take a hardline
approach and eliminate the problem as quickly as possible—
prioritizing the quick return of Central Americans and deterring
future migration above all else.10 However, after months of negative
media coverage and outcry from immigration advocates, the Obama
Administration ultimately adopted a more humane approach toward
Central American women and children apprehended at the
border.11
1. Cause of the Central American Migrant Crisis – Background on
the Northern Triangle
In recent years, the Central American countries of Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador (collectively known as the “Northern
Triangle”) have experienced a dramatic uptick of violence, largely at
the hands of violent gangs and drug cartels.12 Between 2005 and
2015, over 150,000 people in the Northern Triangle were
murdered.13 According to data from the World Bank, in 2015, El
Salvador had the highest homicide rate per capita with a staggering

our hands.” And what I want to do is when I take executive action, I want
to make sure that it’s sustainable.
Interview by Chuck Todd, Political Director, NBC News, with Barack Obama, U.S.
President (Sept. 4, 2014), in NBC NEWS: MEET THE PRESS, https://www.nbcnews.
com/meet-the-press/president-barack-obamas-full-interview-nbcs-chuck-todd-n197
616 [https://perma.cc/7XZL-7VPR]; see Paul Lewis & Dan Roberts, Democrats Tell
Obama: Drop Immigration Reform to Save Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2014, 1:35
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/obama-pressure-democr
ts-abandon-immigration-reform [https://perma. cc/W9F8-FLFC].
10. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, The Obama
Administration’s Government-Wide Response to Influx of Central American
Migrants at the Southwest Border (Aug. 1, 2014) [hereinafter August 2014
Immigration Press Release], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/08/01/obama-administration-s-government-wide-response-influx-cent
ral-american- [https://perma.cc/4P2Y-2LTC].
11. See infra Part II.A.4.
12. Suchit Chavez & Jessica Avalos, The Northern Triangle: The Countries That
Don’t Cry for Their Dead, INSIGHT CRIME (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.insightcrime
.org/news/analysis/the-northern-triangle-the-countries-that-dont-cry-for-their-dea
d/ [https://perma.cc/BMW5-PDDX].
13. Intentional Homicide, Counts and Rates per 100,000 Population, U.N. OFF. ON
DRUGS & CRIME, https://data.unodc.org/#state [https://perma.cc/5H4F-5DP8]
(follow “Crime and Criminal Justice” hyperlink; then follow “Homicide” hyperlink;
then follow “Homicide counts and rates (2000-2015)” hyperlink; then select “Run
Report”) (last visited June 20, 2018).
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108.64 killing deaths per 100,000, and Honduras had the second
highest rate with 63.75 deaths per 100,000.14 While no data is
available for Guatemala from 2015, in 2014, Guatemala had the
seventh highest murder rate per capita with 31.21 deaths per
100,000.15
At the root of the high homicide rate in the Northern Triangle
is the marked uptick in violent activity by the Mara Salvatrucha
(MS-13), the 18th Street Gang, and other sophisticated criminal
enterprises.16 In many parts of Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras, these gangs are able to operate with
impunity—terrorizing citizens, demanding bribes, and engaging in
“forced recruitment” of young residents, particularly teenage boys.17
According to a 2012 report by the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), an estimated 54,000 Northern Triangle residents are
members of either the MS-13 or the 18th Street Gang.18
Women and girls in the Northern Triangle are also at increased
risk of violence and death.19 In Honduras, gender-based violence,
including domestic violence, is the second highest cause of death for
women of reproductive age.20 Yet, perpetrators in Honduras are
rarely brought to justice.21 El Salvador’s justice system routinely fails
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES. SERV., GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
5–7 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XR6CNSE]; see also U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND
ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO
16 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/5630f24c6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PFY-AXPM].
17. See JESSICA JONES & JENNIFER PODKUL, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, FORCED
FROM HOME: THE LOST BOYS AND GIRLS OF CENTRAL AMERICA 9–13 (Oct. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION REPORT–CENTRAL AMERICA],
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/zdocs/document?id=84
4-forced-from-home-the-lost-boys-and-girls-of-central-america [https://perma.cc/
M8J6-CEF9] (follow “Forced From Home: The Lost Boys and Girls of Central
America” hyperlink).
18. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 27–28 (2012),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/Studies/TOC_Central_Am
erica_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFY2-5CEM].
19. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION REPORT–CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 17, at
9–13.
20. Id. at 10.
21. While homicide was the second highest cause of death for Honduran
women in 2010, perpetrators were largely unpunished. See id. Between 2005 and
2010, 96 percent of all reported femicide cases went uninvestigated and
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to prosecute femicides and other crimes against women, despite the
brutal nature of these crimes.22 In Guatemala, the dramatic increase
in violent crimes against women and femicide has risen to epidemic
levels, with the United Nations and other NGOs expressing serious
concerns over the spiraling rates of rape, torture, and murder of
women.23 Equally troubling, several NGOs have reported that the
MS-13, the 18th Street Gang, and other cartels are committing
systematic physical and sexual abuse against women in the Northern
Triangle.24
By 2014, the instability in the Northern Triangle spilled across
the southern border of the United States. In fiscal year (FY) 2014,
there were a total of 479,371 individuals apprehended along the
U.S.-Mexico border, with a dramatic surge in apprehensions of
Central Americans from the Northern Triangle.25 Of particular note,
unprosecuted. See id.; see also Annie Kelly, Honduran Police Turn a Blind Eye To
Soaring
Number
of
‘Femicides’,
THE GUARDIAN
(May
28,
2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/29/honduras-blind-eye-femicides
[https://perma.cc/6B9Y-FJKS].
22. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., EL SALVADOR: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
INCLUDING NON-DOMESTIC SEXUAL VIOLENCE, LEGISLATION, STATE PROTECTION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES (2015), http://www.refworld.org/docid/560b8b294.html
[https://perma.cc/BA6C-NYAJ].
23. See Karen Musalo & Blaine Bookey, Crimes Without Punishment: An Update on
Violence Against Women and Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
269–73
(2013),
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/
265,
Musalo_Bookey_CrimesWithoutPunishment_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FQHD7RH]. See generally U.N. General Assembly, Annual Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/21/Add.1 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A.HRC.19.21.Add.1_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UB7-7UZA] (providing an overview of the “human rights
situation in Guatemala” in 2011).
24. See RIBANDO SEELKE, supra note 16, at 6. See generally KIDS IN NEED OF
DEFENSE, NEITHER SECURITY NOR JUSTICE: SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AND
GANG VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND GUATEMALA 4–7 (2017),
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Neither-Security-nor-Justi
ce_SGBV-Gang-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSW4-JWL8] (examining
the “relationship between gang violence and SGBC in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala.”).
25. In FY 2014, for the first time in history a majority of the apprehensions on
the southern border were non-Mexican nationals, many of whom were from the
Northern Triangle. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
APPREHENSION/SEIZURE STAT. (2014), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/doc
uments/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector%20profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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in FY 2014, nearly half of the Northern Triangle apprehensions on
the southern border were unaccompanied minors and family units,
often consisting of women traveling with young children.26
2. Initial Response by the Obama Administration to the Crisis
While conditions in the Northern Triangle would suggest that
the rise in apprehensions reflected a humanitarian crisis that forced
thousands to flee violence and insecurity in their homeland, to the
Obama Administration, the surge in Central American
apprehensions was a huge political liability.27 Mindful of the
upcoming midterm elections and Republican rhetoric that
President Obama was soft on border security,28 the Administration
initially chose to take a hardline policy against Central American
migrants in an effort to appease conservative critics and mitigate
negative conservative media coverage of the crisis.29 Under this
approach, the Obama Administration took the position that the
apprehended Central Americans were “illegal migrants” who had no
legal basis to remain in the U.S. and sought to return those
apprehended to their home countries as quickly as possible.30

PP8U-9YTX]. In FY 2014, there were 479,371 apprehensions, including 252,600
“Other Than Mexican” apprehensions. See id.
26. In FY 2014, Border Patrol apprehended a total of 61,334 guardians and
children travelling as family units and 51,705 unaccompanied minors from El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., SW. BORDER SECTORS STAT. (2014), https://www.cbp.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Southwest%20Border%20Family%20Units
%20and%20UAC%20Apps%20FY13%20-%20FY14.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB3JJ49J].
27. See infra notes 67–68.
28. Muzaffar Chishti et al., The Obama Record on Deportations: Deporter in
Chief or Not?, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.
org/article/obama-record-deportations-deporter-chief-or-not [https://perma.cc/
EZM7-ZQKQ].
29. Amanda Sakuma, Human Rights Groups Outraged Over Obama’s Deportation
Proposal, MSNBC (June 30, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/human-rightsgroups-outraged-over-obamas-deportation-proposal#51295 [https://perma.cc/UK
P9-YFLR].
30. Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement
Before Senate Appropriations Committee (July 10, 2014) [hereinafter DHS Sec.
Johnson Senate Statement], https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/statementsecretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-senate-committee-appropriations [https:/
/perma.cc/B7GC-PWXP].
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh
Johnson’s statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee on
July 10, 2014 clearly reflected this position.31 Although Secretary
Johnson did note the humanitarian concerns related to the surge of
Central American apprehensions—particularly unaccompanied
minors and family units with small children—he also referred to the
influx of Central American “illegal migrants” who would be swiftly
returned, stating:
The recent and dramatic rise in illegal migration across our
border, from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala,
presents a major challenge to the United States. . . . But, in
the final analysis, our border is not open to illegal
migration. Our message is clear to those who try to illegally
cross our borders: you will be sent back home. We have
already added resources to expedite the removal, without
a hearing before an immigration judge, of adults who come
from these three countries without children. We have
worked with the governments of these countries to
repatriate the adults quicker . . . . Within the last several
months, we have dramatically reduced the removal time of
many of these migrants. Within the law, we are sending this
group back, and we are sending them back quicker. Then
there are adults who brought their children with them.
Again, our message to this group is simple: we will send you
back. We are building additional space to detain these
groups and hold them until their expedited removal orders
are effectuated.32
The approach set forth by Secretary Johnson in his testimony to
the Senate was quickly put into action by DHS and Department of
Justice (DOJ).33 In the spring and summer of 2014, the government
deployed resources to the southern border to ensure the prompt
processing and deportation of the recent arrivals through expedited
removal proceedings.34 In these limited proceedings, individuals are
only allowed to request asylum and present evidence that they have
a credible fear of persecution as a defense to removal.35 Those who
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See August 2014 Immigration Press Release, supra note 10.
34. Id.
35. See generally A Primer on Expedited Removal, AMERICAN IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(Feb. 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/a_primer_on_expedited_removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSB2-QD4K]
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are not able to establish a credible fear of return are swiftly deported
to their country of origin, while those able to establish a credible fear
of persecution are permitted to stay and present an application for
asylum before an immigration judge.36 Because of the presumption
by the Obama Administration that a majority of newly arrived
Central Americans did not have a viable asylum claim, credible fear
passage rates dropped from 74 percent in May 2014 to 62 percent in
July 2014,37 making it possible for DHS to quickly process and
remove many of the migrants apprehended during the crisis.
Additionally, to deter further migration from the Northern
Triangle, DHS took the position that Central American asylum
seekers, including family units with small children, should remain in
detention while they pursued their asylum claims.38 This marked a
significant shift from the Obama Administration’s 2009 policy
directive, in place prior to the 2014 surge, which stated that it was in
the public interest to release asylum seekers from detention after
passing a credible fear interview.39
To justify the Obama Administration’s actions in response to
the Central American surge, DHS officials cited the need to create a
deterrent effect to discourage other Central Americans from making
the dangerous journey from Mexico to the U.S.40 Comments by

(discussing the use of expedited removal).
36. Id.
37. Percentage Credible Fear Screenings with Positive Finding, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug.
2014),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/credible-fear-grantrate-august-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/876R-NP7C].
38. In litigation challenging the detention of Central American asylum seekers,
the DHS submitted declarations from two high-ranking Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officials. See DHS Declarations from High-Ranking Immigration
Officers on Blanket Policy of “No Release,” AM. IMMIGR. L. ASS’N (Aug. 7, 2014)
[hereinafter Aug. 7 DHS Declarations], http://www.aila.org/infonet/dhs-blanketpolicy-no-release [https://perma.cc/VK74-S3V8]. The declarations confirmed the
implementation of a “no bond” or “high bond” policy limiting release of asylum
seekers from detention, in order to deter further migration from Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador. See id.
39. See U.S. IMMIGR & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE POLICY DIRECTIVE NO.
11002.1, PAROLE OF ARRIVING ALIENS FOUND TO HAVE A CREDIBLE FEAR OF
PERSECUTION OR TORTURE
¶ 6.1 (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter ICE 2009 DIRECTIVE
11002.1], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hd-parole_of_arriving_
aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AX3-MWV9].
40. In a June 30, 2014, letter to Congress, President Obama requested
additional funding to respond to the Central American Migrant Crisis to
implement, among other measures, “an aggressive deterrence strategy focused on
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Secretary Johnson and other senior DHS officials also seemed to
reflect the presumption that none of the Central American women
and children had a credible fear of persecution and suggested a
desire to send them back as quickly as possible to deter additional
migration.41 In June 2014, a senior government official told
reporters visiting the Artesia Family Detention Center that “the goal
is to process the immigrants and have them deported within 10 to 15
days to send a message back to their home countries that there are
consequences for illegal immigration.”42
To implement these policies of mass detention and swift
removal, DHS opened two family detention facilities in 2014 to
detain and process women and children apprehended at the
southern border.43 The first of these facilities opened in Artesia, New
Mexico, in late June 2014,44 and a second facility opened two months
later in Karnes City, Texas.45
the removal and repatriation of recent border crossers.” Letter to Speaker of the
House of Representatives John A. Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid,
Senate Minority Leader A. Mitchell McConnell, and House Democratic Leader
Nancy Pelosi on Efforts To Address the Humanitarian Situation in the Río Grande
Valley Areas of the United States-Mexico Border 2, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 509
(June 30, 2009); see DHS Sec. Johnson Senate Statement, supra note 30; Aug. 7 DHS
Declarations, supra note 38.
41. Mike Lillis, DHS Chief Defends Child Detention, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2016, 4:37
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/290316-dhs-chief-defends-childdetention-practices [https://perma.cc/WJD6-P8VH].
42. Juan Carlos Llorca, Fed Says They Will Expedite Deportations to 10-15 Days at
N.M. Facility, SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2014, 8:58 PM), https://www.seattle
times.com/nation-world/fed-says-they-will-expedite-deportations-to-10-15-days-at-n
m-facility [https://perma.cc/4JEN-3X4U].
43. Family Detention: The Unjust Policy of Locking Up Immigrant Mothers With Their
Children, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
issues/family-detention [https://perma.cc/N8XB-DPVD] (last visited June 20,
2018).
44. Alicia A. Caldwell, U.S. to Close Immigrant Detention Center in Artesia, SANTE FE
NEW MEXICAN (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/u-s-toclose-immigrant-detention-center-in-artesia/article_056a06ab-6044-5f04-950f-822b
22779462.html [https://perma.cc/8RS7-BXRC].
45. Background on Family Detention, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Jan. 2015),
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Background%
20on%20Family%20Detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7J5-P65A]; see Julián
Aguilar, Immigration Detention Centers Will Continue Operating Despite Judge’s
Ruling, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2016/12/06/immigration-detention-centers-will-continue-operat/ [https://perma
.cc/HQ9V- RNXJ] (noting that the Karnes Family Residential Center has operated
since August 2014).
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In the first few months after the Artesia Family Detention
Center opened, detained women and children were subjected to an
expedited removal screening process where officers often quickly
determined the detainee had no credible fear of persecution.46 In
July 2014, the first month the detention center was open and
operational, only 40 percent of the women who underwent a
credible fear interview at Artesia were able to establish a positive
finding of credible fear.47 By August 2014, when volunteer attorneys
arrived at the detention center to represent women undergoing
credible fear interviews, the interview pass rate doubled to 80
percent.48 However, for many unrepresented women in Artesia who
did not pass their credible fear interview, the damage was already
done. Between June and October 2014, 306 of the 952 women and
children processed by the Artesia Family Detention Center
(approximately one-third) were deported.49
For Central American unaccompanied minors, the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) required
that unaccompanied non-Mexican children who lacked
authorization to enter the U.S. be transferred to the custody of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (part of the Department of
Health and Human Services) within seventy-two hours of
apprehension.50 After being transferred to ORR custody,
46. See Jude Joffe-Block, Families That are Deported After Crossing the Boarder
Say They Return Home Feeling Hopeless and Desperate, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept. 4, 2014,
4:30 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-04/families-are-deported-aftercrossing-border-say-they-return-home-feeling-hopeless [https://perma.cc/Y7X9976U] (reporting that migrants “are held in detention and placed in expedited
removal proceedings” and “must prove they have a credible fear of persecution”).
Karen Tumlin, an attorney with the National Immigration Law Center, explained
that at the Artesia Family Detention Center, there is a “rush to judgment to deport
as many [of] these women and kids as quickly as possible.” Id.
47. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FAMILY
FACILITIES REASONABLE FEAR (Aug. 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_C
F_RF_FamilyFacilitiesFY14_16Q2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VTK-NT5G].
48. Id.
49. See Melinda Henneberger, When an Immigration Detention Center Comes to a
Small Town, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/st
oryline/wp/2014/10/01/when-an-immigration-detention-center-comes-to-a-smalltown/?utm_term=.c56e9e31a6bd [https://perma.cc/S2VV-FM7Z].
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (2013); OFF. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
orr/programs/ucs [https://perma.cc/PR8X-DN6Y] (last visited June 20, 2018).
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unaccompanied minors are typically placed in a temporary shelter
while ORR contracted caseworkers identify a sponsor—typically a
parent, family member, or family friend residing in the U.S.—who
can take custody of the unaccompanied minor while the minor goes
through removal proceedings before an immigration judge.51 In the
summer of 2014, citing a lack of existing resources to deal with the
surge of unaccompanied minors at the border, ORR opened three
large temporary facilities for unaccompanied minors on Lackland
Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas; Fort Sill Army Base in
Oklahoma; and Port Hueneme Naval Base in Ventura, California.52
While Central American unaccompanied minors were exempt
from expedited removal proceedings and had more protections
than adults and family units apprehended at the southern border in
FY 2014, President Obama set the expectation that a majority of the
unaccompanied minors would also be quickly returned, stating:
In recent weeks, we’ve seen a surge of unaccompanied
children arrive at the border . . . . The journey is
unbelievably dangerous for these kids. The children who
are fortunate enough to survive it will be taken care of while
they go through the legal process, but in most cases that
process will lead to them being sent back home.53
Although treatment of the different subgroups of Central
Americans apprehended in FY 2014 slightly varied, each approach
shared a common goal—swift removal and return of the recent
Central American arrivals and deterrence of further migration from
Central America.54 However, as negative coverage of the Central

51. See generally OFF. OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED: SECTION 2 (Jan. 30,
2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-entering-the-united-statesunaccompanied-section-2 [https://perma.cc/Q3K7-C2VN] (summarizing the
timely release process of “children who are apprehended in the United States
without a parent or legal guardian available to provide care and custody without
immigration status”).
52. Sarah Bronstein, Unaccompanied Children at Our Border: Why They Are Coming,
What Happens Once They’re Here and How to Help, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Aug. 15,
2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/unaccompanied-children-at-our-borderwhy-they-are-coming-what-happens-once-they%E2%80%99re-here-and [https://
perma.cc/C3BE-NVD3].
53. Remarks on Immigration Reform 1, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 504 (June
30, 2014).
54. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Who Gets to Stay?, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2014, 6:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/immig
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American Migrant Crisis unfolded throughout the second half of FY
2014 and into FY 2015, the Obama Administration was forced to
recalibrate its response to the crisis along the southern border.55
3. Media Coverage of the Central American Migrant Surge and
Public Response
When the Obama Administration rolled out its initial strategy
for addressing the Central American Migrant Crisis, it was met with
a corresponding surge in media coverage that was largely critical of
the Administration’s approach.56 Between June 2014 and August
2014 alone, US media outlets published over 3,000 stories about
Central American family detention, unaccompanied minors, and
family units with children.57 The initial coverage in June and July of

rants_seeking_asylum_courts_say_yes_for_domestic_violence_no_for_gang.html
[https://perma.cc/LEQ9-F9LU] (chronicling the evolving treatment of victims
of domestic violence as a migrant subgroup by the U.S. Board of Immigration
Appeals); Lauren Carasik, The American “Deportation Mill,” BOSTON REV.
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://bostonreview.net/us/lauren-carasik-artesia-fletc-immigrant
[https://perma.cc/6HC7-6S44] (quoting U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh
Johnson saying, “Our message to [Central American migrants] is simple: we will
send you back” and outlining the “Obama administration’s aggressive deportation
regime[‘s]” plan to process and deport immigrants within ten to fifteen days).
55. See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central
American Migrants to Their Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deport
ations-central-america [https://perma.cc/5BTF-A3U9]; Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S.
to Admit More Central American Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/us/politics/obama-refugees-central-amer
ica.html [https://perma.cc/4Y2Y-8MU7] (reporting the Obama administration’s
broadening of rules was the result of “years of complaints from advocates for
immigrants”); Michael Martinez et al., Growing Protests Over Where to Shelter
Immigrant Children Hits Arizona, CNN (July 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/
07/15/us/arizona-immigrant-children/index.html
[https://perma.cc/BGA5YSQD].
56. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, Obama and the Americas: Promise,
Disappointment, Opportunity, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 110, 115 (July/Aug. 2010),
https://docslide.net/documents/obama-and-the-americas-promise-dissapointmen
t-opportunity.html/ [https://perma.cc/LK5J-JJWM] (discussing some media
outlets’ critical treatment of the Obama Administration’s plan).
57. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then
type “Central America!” AND “Unaccompanied” OR “Family Detention” in the first
text box (quotations included); then select from the “Publication date” dropdown
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2014 largely focused on the large number of Central Americans
apprehended and emergency resources deployed to the border58
and the shortcomings of the Administration’s response.59
Much of the initial reporting criticizing the Administration
focused on conditions at facilities holding unaccompanied children
and family units with small children.60 Many of these stories
documented how unaccompanied children were being held in
unsanitary and overcrowded facilities,61 in violation of the TVPRA
requirement that children must be transferred to ORR custody
within seventy-two hours of apprehension.62 Images of large crowds
of young children packed into holding rooms at detention facilities,
broadcasted nightly on cable news during the height of the surge,
shocked Americans across the country.63 Legal advocates also raised
“Specific date range…”; then enter the date range June 1, 2014–August 31, 2014;
then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
58. See ADAM ISACSON ET AL., WASH. OFF. LATIN AMERICA, MEXICO’S OTHER
BORDER: SECURITY, MIGRATION, AND THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE LINE WITH
CENTRAL AMERICA 3 (June 17, 2014), https://www.wola.org/analysis/new-wolareport-on-mexicos-southern-border/ [https://perma.cc/92R6-M7N2].
59. See id.
60. See Benjamin Goad, Groups Cite ‘Horrific’ Conditions at Immigrant Detention
Center, THE HILL, (July 24, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/adminis
tration/213264-groups-cite-horrific-conditions-for-immigrant-detainees [https://
perma.cc/54YY-26K2]. See generally Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are These?
Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (2005) (offering background information about the plight of
unaccompanied, undocumented alien children).
61. See Goad, supra note 60. See generally Nugent, supra note 60.
62. A number of news stories reported that unaccompanied minors were held
by CBP and Border Patrol for days in short-term holding cells. See Ed Pilkington, ‘It
was Cold, Very Cold:’ Migrant Children Endure Border Patrol ‘Ice Boxes’, THE
GUARDIAN, (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/jan/26/migrant-children-border-patrol-ice-boxes [https://perma.cc/
L896-X98F]; James Lyall, “Welcome to Hell:” The Border Patrol’s Repeated Abuse of
Children, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG
(June
24,
2014,
10:45 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-lyall/welcome-to-hell-the-borde_b_55279
67.html [https://perma.cc/C26F-7HC6]. The holding cells were known for their
cold temperatures (detainees referred to the holding cells as “hieleras,” the Spanish
word for ice box) and crowded, unsanitary conditions. See id.
63. Between May 1, 2014 and August 31, 2014, a search of three cable
news
networks
showed
MSNBC
aired
113
stories,
MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.com/search/unaccompanied%20children [https://perma.cc/
CWS6-T4FX] (last visited June 20, 2018), Fox News aired 190 stories, FOX NEWS,
http://www.foxnews.com/search-results/search?q=unaccompanied%20children&
ss=fn&min_date=2014-05-01&max_date=2014-08-31&start=0 [https://perma.cc/
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concerns about the conditions and lack of access to attorneys at the
military bases in California, Texas, and Oklahoma that served as
temporary shelters for unaccompanied minors.64
By late July 2014, shortly after teams of volunteer attorneys
arrived at the Artesia Family Detention Center, reports emerged that
the family detention centers were “deportation mills.”65 The reports
asserted that the centers violated the due process rights of detainees
and failed to adequately consider their asylum claims.66 In addition
to due process concerns, advocates also criticized the poor
conditions at the Artesia facility, where women and children suffered
physical and emotional harm due to their prolonged detention at
the facility.67 On August 22, 2014, shortly after these reports
emerged, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), American
Immigration Council (AIC), National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and the National Immigration Law
Center (NILC) filed a class action suit on behalf of mothers detained
at the Artesia facility.68 The suit, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson,69 alleged that
the government violated mothers’ due process rights during initial
asylum screenings and challenged the conditions at the Artesia
facility.70
The Obama Administration’s response to the migrant crisis also
drew the ire of conservative media.71 Much of this coverage blamed
BA2T-WVRQ] (last visited June 20, 2018), and CNN aired 96 stories each discussing
the
surge
of
unaccompanied
children
at
the
border
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/search/?q=unaccompanied%20children&size=10&page=19
&from=180&sort=newest [https://perma.cc/2EQC-B2TB] (last visited June 20,
2018).
64. Bronstein, supra note 52.
65. See Henneberger, supra note 49.
66. See id.; see also Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention
Camps, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/
magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html [https://perma.cc/
29SW-FXDL].
67. See Eleanor Acer, Immigrant Families not Treated Properly, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Aug. 3, 2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/439865/immigrantfamilies-not-treated-properly.html [https://perma.cc/3ACC-LBGM]; Goad, supra
note 60.
68. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No.
1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
69. M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014).
70. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, supra note 68.
71. See, e.g., Nebraska Gov, Illinois Senator Say White House Sending Illegal Immigrant
Children to Their States Without Notice, FOX NEWS (July 13, 2014),

2018]

THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY 819

the surge on President Obama’s weak record on immigration and
border security,72 and several Republican officials argued that the
2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program
encouraged unaccompanied minors to come to the U.S. and seek
amnesty.73
Though the Obama Administration attempted to take tough
and swift action to appease conservative critics before the 2014
midterm elections, in the end, neither conservatives nor liberals
approved of President Obama’s handling of the Central American
Migrant Crisis. Conservatives viewed the rise in Central American
apprehensions as reflective of President Obama’s soft stance on
border security and were not satisfied with the Administration’s
response.74 Conversely, the expansion of family detention and lack
of due process for Central Americans seeking asylum alienated
President Obama’s liberal base.75 By July 2014, polling showed that
the Obama Administration’s approach to the crisis was widely
unpopular, with 58 percent of respondents disapproving of
President Obama’s response to the border crisis.76

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/13/nebraska-governor-illinois-senator
-say-white-house-secretly-sending-illegal.html [https://perma.cc/U8LM-4JQL].
72. See, e.g., Daily Caller, ICE Ends Use of ‘Alien’ in Reference to Child Immigrants,
ˆFOX NEWS (July 4, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/04/iceends-use-alien-in-references-to-child-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/D8TGXJ7H].
73. See, e.g., ]; Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Richard Simon, Republicans Blame Obama
Policies for Immigration Crisis on Border, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2014),
http://beta.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-border-20140620-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9RY5-YXT5]; Amanda Sakuma, GOP Takes Border Crisis out on
DREAMers, MSNBC NEWS (July 21, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://www.msnbc.
com/msnbc/gop-takes-border-crisis-out-dreamers [https:// perma.cc/JZ3J-8FDZ.
74. According to a July 2014 CNN poll, the Central American Migrant Crisis
quickly shifted public opinion toward a more hawkish view on immigration,
particularly for Republicans, with over 75 percent of Republicans responding that
the main focus of U.S. immigration policy should be “border security” versus “legal
status for immigrants.” See Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll: Border Crisis Impacting Public
Opinion on Immigration, CNN (July 24, 2014, 5:01 PM) http://politicalticker.blogs
.cnn.com/2014/07/24/cnn-poll-border-crisis-impacting-public-opinion-on-immigr
ation/ [https://perma.cc/G9GN-E6PP].
75. Acer, supra note 67.
76. Poor Marks for Obama and Republicans on Border Crisis, WASH. POST. (July
15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/poor-marks-obamarepublicans-border-crisis/2014/07/15/a10cb0be-0c0f-11e4-bc42-59a59e5f9e42_pa
ge.html [https://perma.cc/K43Y-HZ8T].
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4. Obama Administration’s Evolving Position on Family Detention
After the political failure of President Obama’s initial response
to the Central American migrant surge, legal challenges to family
detention, and pressure from immigrant rights organizations and
progressives, the Obama Administration eventually adopted a more
humane approach toward the crisis. On September 5, 2014, several
weeks after M.S.P.C. v. Johnson was filed in federal court, DHS sent a
team of senior officials to monitor the situation in Artesia.77 By midSeptember, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security
acknowledged the concerns and promised to quickly address any
issues during the detainees asylum proceedings.78
On November 18, 2014, two weeks after the 2014 midterm
elections, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
announced that it would close the Artesia detention facility,79 and on
December 18, 2014, the facility closed.80 While the suit and negative
coverage did result in the closure of the Artesia detention facility,
this did not mark the end of long-term family detention of Central
American women and children.81 Instead, the women and children
detained at Artesia were transferred to an even larger newly opened
family detention facility in Dilley, Texas82 and long-term detention
of Central American women and children continued into 2015.83
On January 6, 2015, less than a month after the Artesia
detention facility closed, the ACLU filed a second class action suit
on behalf of detained mothers and children at the Karnes and Dilley
77. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 2, M.S.P.C. v. Johnson, No. 1:14cv-01437-ABJ (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2015).
78. Id. at 2–3.
79. Lauren Villagran, Artesia Immigrant Detention Center Closes, ALBUQUERQUE J.
(Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.abqjournal.com/516099/abqnewsseeker/artesiaimmigrant-detention-center-closes.html [https://perma.cc/D359-CNNC].
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Claudia Morales, Families Crossing the Border: ‘We Are Not Criminals,’
CNN (Nov. 2, 2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/us/family-imm
igration-detention-centers/index.html [https://perma.cc/DA4U-GZHB]; The
Editorial Board, Mr. Obama’s Dubious Detention Centers, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/opinion/mr-obamas-dubious-detention-c
enters.html [https://perma.cc/3ER9-95GB].
82. U.S. IMMIGR & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE’S NEW
FAMILY DETENTION CENTER IN DILLEY, TEXAS TO OPEN IN DECEMBER (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ices-new-family-detention-center-dilley-texasopen-december [https://perma.cc/A74E-RMB3].
83. Id.
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family detention facilities: R.I.L-R. v. Johnson.84 The ACLU brought
this suit to challenge DHS’s blanket “no-release” policy.85 This policy
involved detaining nearly all Central American asylum seekers who
had passed their credible fear interview pending adjudication of
their asylum claims.86 The purpose of this policy was to deter future
immigration to the United States from Central America.87 On
February 2, 2015, the ACLU filed a second action—on behalf of
children being held in family detention facilities with their
parents—to enforce the government’s obligations under the 1997
Flores v. Reno settlement agreement governing the detention and
release of immigrant children.88
On February 20, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
government from using deterrence of future migration as the sole
or primary basis for the DHS policy of detaining family units “while
their asylum claims were [being] processed.”89 After this preliminary
injunction, the DHS began making individualized determinations90
concerning detainees’ eligibility for release on parole or bond.91 On
84. Class Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 5, R.I.L-R. v.
Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-00011).
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 1 (“DHS applies the No-Release Policy . . . in order to deter other
Central American migrants from coming to the United States.”).
88. The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement set nationwide criteria for the
detention, release, and treatment of immigrant children. Family Detention & the
Flores Settlement, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE
SERVS. (2017), https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/FloresSettlement-and-Family-Detention-July-2015.pdf [https://permia.cc/QVJ2-S7WU].
The Agreement requires government officials to release children from custody
“without unnecessary delay” and to a parent or legal guardian, if possible. Id. If a
minor cannot be released because of a significant public safety or flight risk
concern, he or she must be held in the least restrictive setting, typically a non-secure
facility licensed by a child welfare organization. Id. Plaintiffs filed a motion to
enforce the Flores Settlement Agreement for children detained with a parent in a
family detention facility and to prohibit children’s long term detention in family
detention centers. Id.
89. R.I.L-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 190 (D.D.C. 2015).
90. See ICE July 2015 Family Detention Announcement, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR.
(July 13, 2015), http://immigrantjustice.org/ice-july-2015-family-detentionannouncement [https://perma.cc/B5YS-X8FB] (describing the individualized
approach “going forward” that ICE planned to utilize after abandoning the DHS’s
“general deterrence” policy).
91. See RILR. v. Johnson, ACLU (July 31, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/
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May 13, 2015, in response to the district court’s order and ongoing
negative media coverage, ICE issued a statement announcing that
the agency would no longer use deterrence of future migration as
the basis for denying parole or bond to detained family units who
had passed a credible fear interview.92 The May 2015 ICE statement
also announced a series of measures aimed at improving conditions
at the family detention centers and shortening the detention time
for family units.93
But these improvements did not come quickly enough for
Democratic congressional leaders. On May 27, 2015, 136 Democratic
members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to DHS
Secretary Jeh Johnson expressing concerns about the continuing
long-term detention of parents and children and demanding an end
to long-term detention at family detention centers.94 This was
followed by a June 1, 2015, companion letter to Secretary Johnson,
signed by 33 Senate Democrats.95
After a year of negative coverage of the Central American
Migrant Crisis, impact litigation challenging family detention, and
vocal opposition within President Obama’s own party, the Obama
Administration decided to end long-term family detention.96 On
cases/rilr-v-johnson [https://perma.cc/MW2S-AW6T] (“[ICE] issued a policy that
it would not consider general deterrence in its detention decisions for families.”).
92. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE
ANNOUNCES ENHANCED OVERSIGHT FOR FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS (May 13, 2015),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-enhanced-oversight-family-resi
dential-centers [https://perma.cc/4FWE-5CRQ].
93. Id. (stating ICE’s intention to “further enhance . . . conditions” at “family
residential centers” and that “because of the sensitive and unique nature of
detaining adults with children, ICE will also implement a review process for any
families detained beyond 90 days, and every 60 days thereafter”).
94. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, 136 House Dems–Letter to
DHS Sec. Johnson on Family/Child Detention (May 27, 2015),
https://lofgren.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397944 [htt
ps://perma.cc/5AR7-VD5M].
95. Letter from U.S. Senators to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(June 1, 2015 https://www.aclu.org/letter/us-senate-sign-letter-dhs-secretaryjohnson-family-detention [https://perma.cc/4HEE-ZN2P].
96. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO CHILDREN ARRIVING AT THE BORDER: LAWS,
POLICIES, AND RESPONSES 10 (June 26, 2015), https://www.american
immigrationcouncil.org/research/guide-children-arriving-border-laws-policies-and
-responses [https://perma.cc/L9Z2-77R9] (“In 2014 and 2015, several detained
families filed lawsuits to challenge various aspects of family detention.”); Tom Dart,
Child Migrants at Texas Border: An Immigration Crisis That’s Hardly New, THE GUARDIAN
(July 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/09/us-immigration-
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June 24, 2015, Secretary Johnson issued a statement announcing a
dramatic shift in policy with respect to family detention, stating:
I have reached the conclusion that we must make
substantial changes in our detention practices with respect
to families with children. In short, once a family has
established eligibility for asylum or other relief under our
laws, long-term detention is an inefficient use of our
resources and should be discontinued.97
Under the new policy set forth by Secretary Johnson, families
who established a credible fear of persecution were promptly
released on bond or an alternative to detention (such as an ankle
monitor)98 pending adjudication of their asylum claim.99 Secretary
Johnson also directed DHS officials to complete credible fear
interview screening for detained family units “within a reasonable
timeframe” to ensure their prompt release.100 A month later, Judge
Dolly Gee of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California issued a ruling that long-term detention of family units
with minor children violated the Flores Settlement Agreement,
codifying Secretary Johnson’s directive into a court order.101
undocumented-children-texas [https://perma.cc/2JWA-2D3K] (describing the
“humanitarian crisis” of immigrants fleeing Central America and the “crowded . . .
[and] unsanitary conditions” in family detention centers).
97. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec’y Jeh
Johnson on Family Residential Ctrs. (June 24, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2015/ 06/24/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residential-centers [https://
perma.cc/9PTA-H7BX]. Secretary Johnson’s statement also noted that the Family
Detention Center in Dilley, Texas, would remain open, but would only serve as a
short-term processing center to complete credible fear screenings and to process
families for release on parole or bond. Id.
98. LUTHERAN IMMIGR. & REFUGEE SERV., FAMILY DETENTION RELEASE AND
PLACEMENT ALTERNATIVES: INITIAL REPORT ON LEARNING 2–6 (2016),
http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/LIRS_FPAInitialReport.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/8JAB-789D].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The 1997 Flores Settlement Agreement governs the minimum standards
for the detention, release, and treatment of minors. Stipulated Settlement
Agreement at 3, Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. 1997). Judge Gee,
in the 2015 enforcement action, found that the family detention centers (Dilley,
Texas; Karnes, Texas; and Berks, Pennsylvania) failed to meet such minimum
standards. Flores v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 3d 864, 878 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The
obligations set forth in this ruling require that detention of family units comply with
the Flores settlement, and are subject to court order. See Holly Fuhrman, The Flores
Ruling and the Possible End to Family Detention, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 3, 2015),
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While issues do still arise,102 since June 2015, the vast majority of
family units apprehended and held at a family detention center have
undergone a credible fear screening and are released within twenty
days of arrival, marking a drastic improvement from the initial
response in the summer of 2014.103
B.

Syrian Refugee Crisis and Response from the United States

As the Central American Migrant Crisis was unfolding in 2014
and 2015, the world was facing a second humanitarian crisis in
Syria.104 In comparison to the Central American Migrant Crisis,
President Obama’s response in 2015 to the Syrian Refugee Crisis
represented the values of his liberal base and clearly reflected lessons
learned from the Central American Migrant Crisis.105

https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/flores-ruling-and-possible-end-family-dete
ntion [https://perma.cc/JBQ2-7VR5]; Julia Preston, Judge Orders Release of Immigrant
Children Detained by U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/26/us/detained-immigrant-children-judge-dolly-gee-ruling.html [https:/
/perma.cc/H3KJ-QMNP]. Further, unlike Secretary Johnson’s directive, these
obligations under the Flores settlement created by Judge Gee’s July 2015 order are
binding, and therefore cannot be reversed by subsequent Administrations.
102. Since early 2017, there have been several reports that DHS is considering
separating family units apprehended at the border. See generally infra Part III.B.3.
103. See generally Valeria Gomez & Karla Mari McKanders, Refugee Reception and
Perception: U.S. Detention Camps & German Welcome Centers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 523,
538–39 (2017) (describing credible fear screening and release processes for family
units detained at the Southern Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas).
104. See generally Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 [https://perma.cc/F4888ABU] (outlining the events that transpired in Syria to create a crisis prior to early
2016).
105. Compare Laura Koran, Obama: Refugee Crisis is Test of Our Humanity, CNN
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/obama-refugeessummit/index.html [https://perma.cc/K7RW-3KU3] (describing President
Obama’s impassioned call “to alleviate a global refugee crisis of epic proportions”),
with Russell Berman, The New Crackdown on Migrant Families, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/the-obama-administratio
ns-crackdown-on-central-american-migrants/422550/ [https://perma.cc/CMH4PXF7] (noting one of the former President’s critics as saying, “[The Obama
Administration is] treating a [Central American] refugee crisis as an immigration
enforcement issue”).
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1. The Syrian Refugee Crisis – General Background
The root of the Syrian Refugee Crisis can be traced to the Syrian
Civil War, which began in 2011 as an uprising against the regime of
Bashar al-Assad.106 While the protests and uprising in Syria were
initially viewed as a part of the Arab Spring that swept other Arab
nations in early 2011, the Syrian uprising quickly descended into a
bloody civil war.107 By June 2013, two years into the civil war, the
United Nations estimated that over 90,000 Syrians had been killed
in the conflict.108 Further complicating matters was the rise of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) within Syria.109 By 2014, ISIS
seized control of significant portions of Syria.110
Between the violence of the civil war and the rise of ISIS,
thousands of Syrians were forced to flee their homeland and seek
refuge in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt,
Iraq, and Jordan.111 By March 2013, the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported that one million
Syrians had registered as refugees in neighboring countries.112 Six
months later, in September 2013, the total number of registered
Syrian refugees doubled to two million.113 According to statistics
106. Kathy Gilsinan, The Confused Person’s Guide to the Syrian Civil War, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/syri
an-civil-war-guide-isis/410746/ [https://perma.cc/525L-2WK6].
107. Id.
108. Nearly 93,000 People Killed in ‘Vicious’ Syria Conflict–UN Human Rights
Chief, U.N. NEWS CTR. (June 13, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=45162#.Wh8U3egrLIU [https://perma.cc/3RS6-MUA7].
109. See generally The Rise and Fall of ISIL Explained, ALJAZEERA (June 20, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/rise-fall-isil-explained-1706
07085701484.html [https://perma.cc/W3JV-2AL4] (providing a generalized
history of ISIS’s development and its current status as of mid-2017).
110. See id. (“By 2014, ISIL had taken Mosul from a defeated Iraqi army, as well
as Raqqa and oil-rich Deir Az Zor in Syria.”).
111. Mona Chalabi, Syrian Refugees: How Many Are There and Where Are They?, THE
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2013, 2:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/
datablog/2013/jul/25/syrian-refugee-crisis-in-numbers-updated [https://perma.
cc/7UPV-A75B].
112. Adrian Edwards, ed. Leo Dobbs, Number of Syrian Refugees Reaches 1
Million
Mark,
UNHCR
(Mar.
6,
2013),
http://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/latest/2013/3/513625ed6/number-syrian-refugees-reaches-1-million-mar
k.html [https:// perma.cc/6RKK-QLJR].
113. Adrian Edwards, Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 2 Million Mark with More on
the Way, UNHCR (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2013/
9/522495669/number-syrian-refugees-tops-2-million-mark-way.html [https://perm
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from the UNHCR, as of December 2017, there are approximately 5.4
million registered Syrian refugees worldwide.114
Given the high number of displaced Syrian refugees, the
UNHCR, other NGOs, and the host countries had difficulty raising
sufficient humanitarian funds to meet the basic needs of this refugee
population.115 By 2014, there were widespread reports of
malnutrition and disease, including cases of polio within Syrian
refugee populations in Iraq and Lebanon.116 With resources spread
thin, neighboring countries began to place limits on accepting new
refugees.117 In October 2014, the New York Times reported that
Jordan closed its borders to new Syrian refugees,118 and in January
2015, Lebanon implemented visa restrictions on new Syrian refugee
arrivals.119
By late 2013, in response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, a number
of European Union countries made a commitment to accept a
a.cc/YQ7C-JPYX].
114. Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal,
UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [https://perma.cc/
DDD8-452T] (last visited June 20, 2018).
115. See Chalabi, supra note 111 (stating that the UN has received only about 38
percent of the funds required to address the needs of refugees and NGOs has
received a small fraction of the funding needed to meet needs on the ground, with
the World Food Program only receiving 17 percent and the International Medical
Corps only receiving 7 percent of required funds).
116. Sam Jones, UN Brands Polio Outbreak in Syria and Iraq ‘Most Challenging
in History’, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/28/un-polio-syria-iraq-most-cha
llenging-history [https://perma.cc/R7DS-WRUM]; see First Case of Polio Suspected
Among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, NBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2014, 10:53 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/syrias-children/first-case-polio-suspected-am
ong-syrian-refugees-lebanon-n49811 [https://perma.cc/7EQP-5N8C].
117. Jack Redden, UNHCR Says it is “Stretched to the Limit” by the Rising Number of
Refugees, UNHCR (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2013/
10/524ae6179/unhcr-says-stretched-limit-rising-number-refugees.html [https://
perma.cc/RK7H-6RZL] (quoting UN High Commissioner for Refugees António
Guterres, stating “UNHCR and its partners are doing everything possible to
respond, but we are stretched to the limits by this combination of an emergency
unparalleled in the recent past, and the persistence of other crises around the
world”).
118. Rana F. Sweis, No Syrians Are Allowed into Jordan, Agencies Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/syrianrefugees-jordan-border-united-nations.html [https://perma.cc/PW7S-M5VD].
119. Syrians Entering Lebanon Face New Restrictions, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30657003 [https://perma.
cc/HHZ5-8DD2].

2018]

THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY 827

limited number of Syrian refugees for resettlement.120 Germany led
this effort, committing to accept 5,000 refugees in 2013.121
Because of deteriorating conditions in refugee camps and the
news that Western European nations were willing to accept Syrian
refugees, many displaced Syrians, along with other migrants from
Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa, began crossing the
Mediterranean by boat to seek asylum in Europe.122 By the end of
2014, the situation had reached a crisis point: over 280,000 migrants,
including nearly 80,000 Syrians, entered the Euro Zone without
authorization,123 with 77 percent of these migrants entering by sea.124
Although the U.S. did commit significant foreign humanitarian
aid to address the refugee crisis125 and provided military aid to
combat ISIS in Syria,126 the United States’ initial commitment to
resettle Syrian refugees was relatively modest compared to its
European counterparts.127 Between FY 2013 and FY 2015, the U.S.
resettled a total of 1,873 Syrian refugees.128 But with one shocking

120. Divers, First Group of Syrian Refugees Flies to Germany, UNHCR (Sept. 11,
2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2013/9/523076919/first-groupsyrian-refugees-flies-germany.html [https://perma.cc/LN67-SA62].
121. Id.
122. Patrick Kingsley, Desperate Syrian Refugees Risk All in Bid to Reach Europe, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop
ment/2014/sep/18/desperate-syrian-refugees-europe-mediterranean
[https://
perma.cc/484N-RLP6].
123. FRONTEX,
ANNUAL
RISK
ANALYSIS
2015,
at
59
(2015),
http://frontex.europa.eu/
assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4JB-DBUY].
124. Id. at 18. (explaining that there were 219,476 detected migrants crossing
by sea and a total of 283,532 illegal border crossing in 2014).
125. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN
RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/
releases/factsheets/2017/269469.htm [https://perma.cc/WD27-NJTD].
126. Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand, BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587 [https://perma.cc/LZ7ZTWB4].
127. Nicole Ostrand, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM.
SEC. 255, 270 (2015) (detailing the number of Syrian asylum applications and
acceptance by country).
128. OFF. REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY
2015 SERVED POPULATIONS BY STATE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (REFUGEES ONLY)
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fy-2015-refugees-by-stateand-country-of-origin-all-served-populations [https://perma.cc/M8RZ-4KPU] (pr-
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photo, the Syrian Refugee Crisis gripped the American public,
resulting in the Obama Administration taking swift action in support
of admitting more Syrian refugees into the U.S.
2. Media Coverage of Syrian Refugee Crisis and Response from the
United States
As the Syrian Refugee Crisis unfolded between 2012 and 2015,
there was considerable worldwide coverage of this emerging
humanitarian crisis. In 2014, there were 17,256 stories in the
international press covering the Syrian Refugee Crisis.129 By
comparison, during the same period, only 7,560 stories covering the
Syrian Refugee Crisis appeared in the American press in 2014,130 and
approximately 30 percent of 2014 U.S. coverage of the Syrian
Refugee Crisis focused, in part, on U.S. military efforts against ISIS
in Syria.131
oviding ORR statistics showing a total of 1,693 refugees from Syrian were resettled
in the U.S. in FY 2015); OFF. OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2013 REFUGEE ARRIVALS (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fiscal-year-2013-refugee-arrivals [https://
perma.cc/T3ES-22YJ] (providing ORR statistics showing a total of forty-eight
refugees from Syrian were resettled in the U.S. in FY 2013); OFFICE REFUGEE
SETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2014 REFUGEE
ARRIVALS (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fiscal-year-2014refugee-arrivals [https://perma.cc/3ETT-EQKW] (providing ORR statistics
showing a total of 132 refugees from Syrian were resettled in the U.S. in FY 2014).
129. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “Canadian
Newsstream,” and “Global Breaking Newswires,” and “International Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Databases”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink;
then type “Syria” AND “Refugee” in the first text box (quotations not included);
then select from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then
enter the date range January 1, 2014–December 31, 2014; then select “Search”
button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
130. Id.
(follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”;
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Syria” and “Refugee” in the
first text box (quotations not included); then select from the “Publication date”
dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter the date range January 1, 2014–
December 31, 2014; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
131. See id. (click on “publications”; then check only “US Newsstream” database;
then click “Advanced Search”; then enter search terms “Syria” AND “Refugee” and
“ISIS” (quotations not included); then select from the “Publication Date”
dropdown, “Specific date range. . .”; then enter the date range January 1, 2014–
December 31, 2014) (last visited June 20, 2018) (finding that after searching “ISIS”
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On September 2, 2015, the U.S. public swiftly turned its
attention to the Syrian Refugee Crisis when an image of a drowned
toddler—Alan Kurdi, washed up on the shore near Bodrum,
Turkey—was circulated by the media.132 The photo of Kurdi’s lifeless
body immediately went viral after it was tweeted by Peter Bouckaert,
Emergencies Director at Human Rights Watch,133 quickly becoming
the global symbol of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. In explaining why he
shared the photo on social media, Bouckaert touched on why the
image was so powerful, stating:
What struck me the most were his little sneakers, certainly
lovingly put on by his parents that morning as they dressed
him for their dangerous journey. One of my favorite
moments of the morning is dressing my kids and helping
them put on their shoes. They always seem to manage to
put something on backwards, to our mutual amusement.
Staring at the image, I couldn’t help imagine that it was one
of my own sons lying there drowned on the beach.134
After the image of Alan Kurdi went viral, coverage of the Syrian
Refugee Crisis surged throughout the United States. Between
September 2, 2015—the day Bouckaert discovered Kurdi’s body on
the Turkish shore—and September 10, 2015, United States news
sources published 1,656 stories about the Syrian Refugee Crisis.135 By
way of comparison, in the nine day period prior to the publication
within the data set of the 7,560 of U.S. articles published on the Syrian Refugee
Crisis in 2014, 2,167 also discuss ISIS).
132. Olivier Laurent, What the Image of Aylan Kurdi Says About the Power of
Photography, TIME (Sept. 4, 2015), http://time.com/4022765/aylan-kurdi-photo/
[https://perma.cc/X6CJ-K4GA] (“As [the images of Aylan Kurdi’s body] spread,
and as individuals and organizations faced the decision of whether and how to
publish them, those pictures have ignited a new kind of conversation about the
crisis.”).
133. Peter Bouckaert (@Bouckap), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2015, 4:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/bouckap/status/639037338362978304
[https://perma.cc/F86E-JBXJ].
134. Peter Bouckaert, Dispatches: Why I Shared a Horrific Photo of a Drowned Syrian
Child, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/
09/02/dispatches-why-i-shared-horrific-photo-drowned-syrian-child [https://perm
a.cc/9AQ9-MUEW].
135. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (click on “publications”; then
check only “US Newsstream” database; then click “Advanced Search”; then enter
search terms “Syria” AND “Refugee” (quotations not included); then select from
the “Publication Date” dropdown, “Specific date range. . .”; then enter the date
range September 2, 2015–September 10, 2015) (last visited June 20, 2018).
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of the photo of Alan Kurdi—from August 24, 2015 to September 1,
2015—only 500 stories appeared in the United States press about the
Syrian Refugee Crisis.136
The image appeared to quickly sway the United States public in
favor of helping Syrian refugees. In a CNN poll taken between
September 4, 2015, and September 8, 2015, 55 percent of
respondents were in favor of accepting Syrian refugees, and 83
percent of respondents were in favor of providing humanitarian aid
to refugees.137 Public engagement in support of refugees also spiked
in the days immediately after the photo of Alan Kurdi went viral.
During the week of September 14, 2015, Syrian-American Activist
George Batah delivered a change.org petition, signed by 330,000
Americans, to the White House demanding the U.S. resettle 65,000
Syrian refugees in FY 2016.138
In contrast to the Administration’s response to the Central
American Migrant Crisis a year earlier, President Obama responded
to the groundswell of media coverage and public support for Syrian
refugees with decisive action. On September 10, 2015, eight days
after the photo of Alan Kurdi was published around the world, the
Obama Administration announced its commitment to resettle a
minimum of 10,000 Syrian refugees in the coming year.139 Later in
the month, on September 21, 2015, the U.S. Department of State
announced that it was providing an additional $419 million in
humanitarian aid to assist Syrian refugees in neighboring countries
136. Id. (click on “publications”; then check only “US Newsstream” database;
then click “Advanced Search”; then enter search terms “Syria” AND “Refugee”
(quotations not included); then select from the “Publication Date” dropdown,
“Specific date range. . .”; then enter the date range August 24, 2015–September 1,
2015) (last visited June 20, 2018).
137. CNN/ORC Poll: Full Results on Migrant Crisis, CNN (Sept. 14, 2015, 1:16 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/14/politics/migrant-crisis-refugees-poll-cnn-orc/i
ndex.html [https://perma.cc/56WU-YGTE].
138. Amanda Terkel, Man Who Started Syrian Refugee Petition Invited to the White
House, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2015, 4:37 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/george-batah-syriapetition_us_561feeaae4b050c6c4a4c76d [https://
perma.cc/5MA5-N7G6]; White House Asked to Help Syrian Refugees, CNN (Sept. 16,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/09/16/exp-syrian-refugee-crisis.
cnn [https://perma.cc/Y4BB-4NSH].
139. See Remarks at the Leaders Summit on Refugees in New York City, 2016
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 616 (Sept. 20, 2016); Gardiner Harris et al., Obama Increases
Number of Syrian Refugees for U.S. Resettlement to 10,000, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/middleeast/obama-directs-admini
nistration-to-accept-10000-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/HF5M-4TFA].
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displaced by the conflict.140 Following up on his commitment to
resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, President Obama formally
raised the annual refugee ceiling from 70,000 to 85,000 for FY 2016
on October 1, 2015.141
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration faced some opposition
to increased resettlement of Syrian refugees, particularly after the
terrorist attack in Paris on November 13, 2015.142 In the wake of the
Paris attack, thirty governors called on the Administration to halt the
resettlement of Syrian refugees,143 and then-presidential candidate
Donald Trump called for surveillance of mosques and possible
creation of a Muslim registry.144 Yet, President Obama’s commitment
to resettle Syrian refugees and increase refugee admissions did not
waver—the Obama Administration exceeded its initial goal and
resettled 12,587 Syrian refugees in FY 2016.145 In FY 2017, President
Obama raised the ceiling on refugee arrivals to 110,000,146 marking
140. Carol Morello, U.S. Gives $419 Million More to Aid Syrian Refugees,
WASH. POST. (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-gives-419-million-more-to-aid-syrian-refugees/2015/09/21/7f0157c6-60
7e-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html?utm_term=.070587639e79 [https://perma.
cc/QFE3-E2JH].
141. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Bureau of
Population, Refugees & Migration, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal
Year 2016, at 5 (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/247982.pdf[https://perma.cc/JJG8-9GDY].
142. See, e.g., More States Say No to Syrian Refugees After Paris Attacks, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-states-say-no-to-syrianrefugees-after-paris-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/Y3U9-M74R].
143. In the wake of the November 13, 2015, terrorist attack in Paris, twenty-nine
Republican Governors and one Democratic Governor (Maggie Hassan of New
Hampshire) publicly called on President Obama to halt plans to resettle Syrian
refugees. See Arnie Seipel, 30 Governors Call for Halt to U.S. Resettlement of Syrian
Refugees, NPR NEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/
456336432/more-governors-oppose-u-s-resettlement-of-syrian-refugees
[https://
perma.cc/T33M-3E3K].
144. Maggie Haberman & Richard Perez-Pena, Donald Trump Sets Off a Furor with
Call to Register Muslims in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/11/21/us/politics/donald-trump-sets-off-a-furor-with-call-to-registermuslims-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/6GEQ-SD2N].
145. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Syrian Refugees in the United States, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/syrianrefugees-united-states [https://perma.cc/XAP2-XNAP].
146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., BUREAU OF
POPULATION, REFUGEES & MIGRATION, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2017, at 5 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/262168.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K4Y-HNSV].
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the first time the refugee ceiling was raised above 100,000 in over
twenty years.147
In the end, President Obama’s September 2015 decision to
increase Syrian refugee resettlement in response to media coverage
and public engagement was politically popular.148 By the summer of
2016, polling showed a majority of Americans, including an
overwhelming majority of Democrats, supported refugee
resettlement.149
III. EXECUTIVE ACTIONS BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IMPACTING
ASYLUM SEEKERS AT THE BORDER AND SYRIAN REFUGEES
Unlike President Obama, a more traditional politician whose
executive decisions on immigration policy could be swayed by media
coverage and public opinion, President Trump’s positions on
immigration have not materially changed since the 2016 presidential
campaign.150
After running on a platform of restrictionist immigration policy,
President Trump began his first week in office by issuing three
executive orders on immigration: the “Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements” Executive Order
(“Border Security Executive Order”) on January 25, 2017;151 the
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States”
Executive Order on January 25, 2017;152 and the “Protecting the

147. See U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings & Number of Refugees Admitted,
1980-Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/
data-hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-ad
mitted-united [https://perma.cc/93W4-NUXV] (last visited June 20, 2018).
148. See, e.g., Juana Summers, Survey: Partisan Split Over U.S. Taking in Refugees,
CNN (June 13, 2016, 11:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/13/
politics/syrian-refugees-poll-american-attitudes/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
M2TW-NTGX] (citing a Brookings Institution survey indicating that 59% of
Americans supported accepting refugees, including 77% of Democrats).
149. See id. (describing that in a June 2016 CNN poll, 58 percent of respondents,
including 77 percent of Democrats, supported refugee resettlement).
150. See Stephen Collinson and Jeremy Diamond, Trump on Immigration: No
Amnesty, No Pivot, CNN: POLITICS (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/
31/politics/donald-trump-immigration-speech/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
56WM-KJW5]; Immigration, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, www.whitehouse.gov/issues/
immigration/ [https://perma.cc/E2WG-2JXX] (last visited June 20, 2018).
151. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
152. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017).

2018]

THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY 833

Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States”
Executive Order on January 27, 2017 (“Travel Ban”).153
Since issuing these executive orders in late January 2017,
President Trump’s positions on the travel ban and border security
have not been swayed by negative media coverage. Because of this,
the role of the media has shifted to informing the public about the
Trump Administration’s actions on immigration, spurring change
through impact litigation and legal advocacy challenging those
actions.154
By signing the Travel Ban and the Border Security Executive
Order during his first week in office, President Trump immediately
made good on his campaign promises and set forth immigration
policies far more restrictionist than any of his predecessors.155 Both
of these executive orders had an immediate impact on Syrian
refugees and Central American asylum seekers, but only the Travel
Ban was quickly halted through litigation.156 As a contrast to Part II,
which examined how media coverage swayed immigration policy
during the Obama Administration, Part III examines the Trump
Administration’s executive action impacting Syrian refugees and
Central American asylum seekers and how the disparate level of
media coverage and corresponding impact litigation has affected
President Trump’s ability to implement these actions.
153. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
154. See, e.g., Matthew Cooper, The Anti-Trump Resistance: Lawyers Lead the Fight
Against the White House, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 10, 2017, 1:06 PM), http://www.newsweek
.com/trump-travel-immigration-ban-muslims-supreme-court-san-francisco-9th-circu
it-555203 [https://perma.cc/RC9A-98MJ; Nick Miroff & David Nakamura, 200,000
Salvadorans May be Forced to Leave the U.S. as Trump Ends Immigration Protection, WASH.
POST (Jan. 8, 2018, 7:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-se
ecurity/trump-administration-to-end-provisional-residency-for-200000salvadorans/
2018/01/08/badfde90-f481-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html?utm_term=.9966
1c226f26 [https://perma.cc/J6YE-YQV3].
155. See, e.g., Cynthia Farrar, What Donald Trump Doesn’t Get About His Own
Immigration Story, POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-immigration-story-video-214389 [https://
perma.cc/AM6E-X4VM]; Summer Meza, Trump’s Election Promises, Both Broken and
Kept, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2017, 8:10 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-oneyear-election-promises-kept-and-broken-704862 [https://perma.cc/V8AU-L5RF].
156. See, e.g., Jaweed Kaleem, Trump’s Travel Ban Could Remain Blocked for Weeks,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/
washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-trump-s-travel-ban-could-remain-bl
ocked-1490313567-htmlstory.html [http://perm a.cc/QL6T-UCU8] (discussing
the litigation stalling the travel ban).
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Travel Ban Executive Order

One week after his inauguration, President Trump ignited a
firestorm when he signed the first in a series of Travel Ban Executive
Orders banning the admission of refugees and nationals of seven
Muslim majority countries.157 The initial thirty-six hours after the
first Travel Ban was issued saw chaos at our nation’s airports,158
ultimately resulting in the first in a series of nationwide injunctions
halting its implementation.159
157. E.g., Trump Travel Ban Sparks Protests at Airports Nationwide, CBS NEWS (Jan.
29,
2017),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-travel-ban-sparksprotests-at-airports-nationwide-seattle-tacoma/ [https://perma.cc/6M55-PX8W]
(covering just some of the domestic protests over the Executive Order, including
those in Seattle, New York, Newark, Chicago, Denver, Dallas, Portland, San
Francisco, San Diego, and Fairfax); Reena Flores, How Foreign Leaders Are Reacting to
Trump’s Travel Ban, CBS NEWS (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
how-foreign-leaders-are-reacting-to-trumps-travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/YQ7Z4L8A] (detailing the international criticism that the ban drew including from such
divergent countries as Iran and France).
158. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/
us/lawyers-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/KHQ8-AFMR]
(noting the efforts of attorneys and legal aid groups to offer advice to individuals
effected); Glenn Kessler, The Number of People Affected by the Trump Travel Ban: About
90,000, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2017/01/30/the-number-of-people-affected-by-trumps-travel-ban-abo
ut-90000/?utm_term=.4c12ba04f8b9 [https://perma.cc/LVL3-3KUK] (looking at
the lack of clarity provided for implementation with the hasty reversal by the White
House regarding the status of entry for green card holders); Eonghan MacGuire et
al., Trump Travel Restrictions Leave Refugees Stranded: Reports, NBC NEWS (Jan. 28,
2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-travel-restrictions-leave-refu
gees-stranded-reports-n713591 [https://perma.cc/EPJ4-9LWK] (highlighting the
challenges faced U.S. Customs officials due to the hasty implementation, which lead
to detentions of peoples all ready in flight at the time of its signing).
159. See generally Ben Jacobs, US Travel Ban Hits Major Setback as Judges Uphold
Temporary
Restraining
Order,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
10,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/09/judges-deny-trump-travel-ba
n-enforcement-uphold-order [https://perma.cc/SJW3-PJ75] (highlighting the
Ninth Circuit’s sustainment of the injunction arising from challenges by
Washington and Minnesota); Rachel Weiner, Federal Judge in Virginia Issues Strong
Rebuke
of
Trump
Travel
Ban,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-in-virginia-grants-prel
iminary-injunction-against-travelban/2017/02/13/a6164bfe-f255-11e6-a9b0-ecee7
ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.9e6f7b00d d53 [https://perma.cc/462E-5JTV]
(reviewing an Eastern District of Virginia’s injunction order and specifically drawing
emphasis to the court’s conclusion that the Executive Order likely violated the
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After the first Travel Ban was effectively blocked by the courts,
the Trump Administration opted to issue a revised, slightly more
tailored version of the Travel Ban on March 6, 2017.160 The second
version of the Travel Ban was also challenged in federal court, and
was eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,161 where the
case was dismissed when the March 6 order expired.162 A third
indefinite version of the Travel Ban, issued as a Presidential
Proclamation on September 28, 2017,163 was allowed to move
forward on December 4, 2017, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued
an unsigned order lifting two nationwide preliminary injunctions
issued by the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.164
Litigation challenging the legality of the third Travel Ban is currently
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.165
Establishment Clause).
160. The second version of the Travel Ban applied to nationals of six countries:
Libya, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Yemen and Syria. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg.
13209 (Mar. 9, 2017). Iraq, included in the original Travel Ban, was removed from
the list of prohibited countries. Id. The second version of the Travel Ban also
specifically exempted lawful permanent residents, individuals who were admitted or
paroled into the U.S., individuals who had been issued a visa prior to the effective
date of the order, dual nationals who are citizens of a non-banned country,
diplomats, and previously admitted refugees and asylees. Id.
161. On June 26, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the two
lead cases challenging the second version of the Travel Ban. Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086–89 (2017), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 4477
(U.S. June 26, 2017) (Nos. 16-1436 (16A1190) & 16-1540 (16A1191)) (consolidating
two cases: Hawaii v. Trump from the Ninth Circuit and Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project from the Fourth Circuit). The Court also granted a stay that
partially lifted the nationwide injunctions issued by the Fourth Circuit and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 2089. In granting the partial stay, the Court
permitted the second Travel Ban to be enforced against individuals from the six
countries who lacked a qualifying bona fide relationship with a U.S. citizen,
permanent resident, or U.S. entity. Id. at 2087–89.
162. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
163. The third version of the Travel Ban contained the same exemptions as the
second version of the Travel Ban but varied from the second version in several
respects. See generally Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
The third version of the Travel Ban applied to six Muslim-majority countries—Iran,
Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Chad and Syria—and two non-Muslim majority countries—
North Korea and certain officials from Venezuela. See id. at 3. Additionally, the third
version of the Travel Ban was indefinite in nature. See generally id.
164. See Trump v. Hawaii, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/trump-v-hawaii-3/ [https://perma.cc/Y8BE-G8YW] (last visited June 20,
2018).
165. See id.

836

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

Yet, the summary above is not the complete story, particularly in
the case of the first version of the Travel Ban. In addition to the
litigation challenging that version of the Travel Ban, there were a
number of external factors (including media coverage, public
engagement, and legal advocacy) that shaped its failed rollout. The
sections below will examine the role of the media and the public in
impact litigation challenging the first Travel Ban. Further, they will
discuss the necessity of continued public engagement as litigation
challenging later versions of the Travel Ban makes its way through
the courts.
1. Impact on Syrian Refugees
On Friday, January 27, 2017, President Trump signed the first
Travel Ban Executive Order.166 The first version of the Travel Ban
had an immediate, adverse impact on Syrian refugees, effectively
reversing President Obama’s commitment to increase Syrian refugee
resettlement.167 In particular, two sections of the Travel Ban
specifically targeted Syrian refugees and other Syrian nationals
inside and outside of the United States.168 First, section 3(c) banned
the admission of nationals from seven countries, including Syria, in
immigrant and nonimmigrant status for a period of ninety days.169
Additionally, section 5 banned the admission of all refugees for a
period of 120 days, reduced the annual ceiling of refugee admissions
to 50,000, and banned the admission of Syrian refugees until
sufficient changes were made to the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program to “ensure that admission of Syrian refugees [was]
consistent with the national interest,”170 effectively creating an
indefinite ban on Syrian refugees.

166. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
167. See id. at 8978–80.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8978. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
“Immigrants” refer to non-citizens holding status that allows them to stay in the U.S.
indefinitely, and “Nonimmigrants” refer to non-citizens admitted to the U.S. with a
visa that permits them to stay for a temporary period of time pursuant to the terms
of their visa. See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (Supp. 2017).
170. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8979–80 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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2. Implementation of the Travel Ban Executive Order and Resulting
Media Coverage
The Travel Ban Executive Order went into effect immediately
after President Trump signed it on the afternoon of Friday, January
27, 2017, and airports across the country quickly descended into
chaos. According to a New York Times article, by the evening of
Saturday, January 28, 2017, 109 travelers in transit to the U.S. were
denied admission in the hours after the Travel Ban was signed.171
Meanwhile, 173 travelers were stopped before being allowed to
board planes to the U.S.172 Other travelers, including lawful
permanent residents, were detained for hours at airports across the
nation as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials attempted
to sort out proper procedures to enforce the Travel Ban.173 In
response, there were a number of protests at airports across the
country as hundreds of Americans demonstrated against the ban.174
Additionally, teams of volunteer attorneys descended on airports to
assist travelers impacted by the Travel Ban.175
By Saturday evening, the ACLU, along with the International
Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), the NILC, and Yale Law School’s
Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization filed a suit in the
Eastern District of New York on behalf of two impacted travelers.176
The suit, Darweesh v. Trump, challenged the legality of the Travel Ban
171. Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017)
[hereinafter Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order], https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumpsimmigration-order.html [https://perma.cc/L8Y9-7GHN] .
172. Id.
173. See Jonathan Allen & Brendan O’Brian, How Trump’s Abrupt Immigration Ban
Sowed Confusion at Airports, Agencies, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2017, 12:25 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-confusion/how-trum
ps-abrupt-immigration-ban-sowed-confusion-at-airports-agenciesidUSKBN15D07S/
[https://perma.cc/M7AP-XTFB]; Evan Perez et al., Inside the Confusion of the Trump
Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban/index.html/ [https://perma.cc/
5WWH-9C2Q]; Matt Stevens, First Travel Ban Order Left Officials Confused, Documents
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/trumptravel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/LR53-YDJS].
174. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order, supra note 171.
175. See Jonah E. Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawye
rs-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/4TNQ-9WE2].
176. See generally Darweesh v. Trump, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/darwee
sh-v-trump/ [https://perma.cc/A8DV-4UEL] (last visited June 20, 2018).
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and included an emergency motion for stay to halt its further
enforcement.177 On Saturday, January 28, Judge Ann M. Donnelly
granted the motion for stay and declared a temporary nationwide
injunction on the Travel Ban.178
As these events were unfolding at airports across the country,
there was round the clock coverage of the Travel Ban’s impact.
Between Friday, January 27, 2017, and Sunday, January 29, 2017, 787
stories in the U.S. media covered the Travel Ban.179 While Judge
Donnelly’s ruling was largely due to the work of the attorneys
representing Mr. Darweesh, the intense media coverage and scrutiny
this case received may have played a small role in the speed with
which Judge Donnelly issued the order temporarily halting the
Travel Ban.
On Monday January 30, 2017, the State of Washington filed a
suit challenging the Travel Ban, alleging it caused injury to the state
and its institutions.180 Several days later, on February 3, 2017, Judge
James L. Robard issued a nationwide temporary restraining order
(TRO) prohibiting enforcement of section 3(c) and section 5 of the
Travel Ban.181 The Trump Administration appealed and filed an
emergency motion to stay the TRO with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.182 In opposition to the government’s motion for the stay of
the TRO, the State of Washington submitted a joint declaration from
ten former national security officials.183 The declaration argued that
177. Id.
178. Darweesh v. Trump, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
179. PROQUEST, https://search-proquest-com (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Databases”; then click “Advanced Search”; then enter
search terms “Travel Ban” (quotations not included) OR “Muslim Ban” (quotations
included); then select from the “Publication Date” dropdown, “Specific date
range. . .”; then enter the date range January 27, 2017–February 29, 2017) (last
visited June 20, 2018).
180. Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017),
appeal dismissed, 2017 WL 3774041 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).
181. Id. at *3 (“The court concludes that the circumstances brought before it
today are such that it must intervene to fulfill its constitutional role in our tripart
government.”).
182. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration
en banc denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2017), and reconsideration en banc denied, 858
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), and cert. denied, Golden v. Washington, 138 S.Ct. 448
(2017).
183. See generally Joint Declaration of Madeleine K. Albright et al., Washington
v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105) (including former

2018]

THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY 839

no particular threat justified the Executive Order, and that the
Travel Ban undermined, rather than assisted, national security.184
Oral arguments on the government’s motion for stay before the
Ninth Circuit were scheduled for February 7, 2017.185 Due to the
high interest in the case, the Ninth Circuit issued an order notifying
the public that a live audio stream of the oral arguments could be
accessed on the court’s public website.186 On February 7, 2017,
135,000 individuals listened to the livestreamed audio through the
Ninth Circuit’s website, and the cable news networks CNN and
MSNBC broadcasted the live audio of the oral argument on-theair.187
On February 9, 2017, the three-judge panel of Judge William
Canby, Jr., Judge Richard Clifton, and Judge Michelle Friedland
issued a unanimous published decision denying the government’s
emergency motion for a stay pending appeal, thereby upholding the
TRO as a preliminary injunction pending adjudication of the case
on the merits.188 On February 16, 2017, one week after the Ninth
Circuit issued the order denying the motion for stay, the Trump
Administration abandoned its efforts to implement the January 27
Executive Order, opting instead to issue a revised Executive
Order.189 In a filing in the Ninth Circuit, the DOJ explained the
Administration’s revised position, by stating:

Secretaries of State Madeleine K. Albright and John F. Kerry, former Secretary of
Defense and CIA Director Leon E. Panetta, and former Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet A. Napolitano).
184. Id. at *2.
185. Order at 1, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 1735105), ECF No. 77.
186. Id.
187. Matt Pearce, Appellate Hearing Over Trump’s Travel Ban Gets Massive Online
&
TV
Audience,
L.A.
TIMES
(Feb
7,
2017,
4:36
PM),
http://beta.latimes.com/politics/la-live-updates-9th-circuit-arguments-appellatehearing-over-trump-s-travel-1486513547-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/M5SNLALH].
188. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017).
189. Washington v. Trump, 855 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.); see Matt
Zapotosky, Trump Says He’ll Issue a New Executive Order on Immigration by Next Week,
WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/trump-says-hell-issue-a-new-executive-order-on-immigration-by-next-week/
2017/02/16/4b65e7d6-f463-11e6-a9b0ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.9b2a3
7126ac4 [https://perma.cc/G8FN-42F5].
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Rather than continuing this litigation, the President
intends in the near future to rescind the Order and replace
it with a new, substantially revised Executive Order to
eliminate what the panel erroneously thought were
constitutional concerns. . . . In so doing, the President will
clear the way for immediately protecting the country rather
than pursuing further, potentially time-consuming
litigation. Under the unusual circumstances presented
here—including
the
extraordinarily
expedited
proceedings and limited briefing to the panel, the
complexity and constitutional magnitude of the issues, the
Court’s sua sponte consideration of rehearing en banc, and
respect for the President’s constitutional responsibilities—
the government respectfully submits that the most
appropriate course would be for the Court to hold its
consideration of the case until the President issues the new
Order and then vacate the panel’s preliminary decision.190
On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued a revised Executive
Order with several key changes, including the elimination of the
indefinite ban on Syrian refugees.191
To those familiar with the typical timeline of federal court
litigation, the speed of the decisions in Darweesh v. Trump and
Washington v. Trump are remarkable. The speed with which the
preliminary orders were rendered by the federal bench on the Travel
Ban was principally motivated by the harm the plaintiffs would suffer
if the Travel Ban were allowed to move forward.192 However, the
intense media scrutiny likely had some impact on the speed of the
proceedings. To provide a sense of the media coverage of the Travel
Ban, between January 27, 2017, and February 27, 2017, a total of
12,589 stories were published in U.S. media sources covering the
Travel Ban.193
190. Supplemental Brief on En Banc Consideration at 4, Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105).
191. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
192. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When the
Executive Order was in effect, the States contend that the travel prohibitions
harmed the States’ university employees and students, separated families, and
stranded the States’ residents abroad. These are substantial injuries and even
irreparable harms.”).
193. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then
type “Travel Ban” (quotations included) in the first text box; then select “OR” in

2018]

THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN SHAPING IMMIGRATION POLICY 841

3. Use of Media Coverage to Support Litigation Challenging the
Travel Ban
The media also played an important role in exposing evidence
that was used to support litigation challenging various versions of the
Travel Ban. The clearest example of this was the January 28, 2017,
Fox News interview by Jeanine Pirro of former New York City Mayor,
Rudy Giuliani.194 When asked how President Trump selected the
seven countries designated in the January 27, 2017, Executive Order,
Giuliani responded:
I’ll tell you the whole history of it. So when he [Trump]
first announced it, he said, “Muslim ban.” He called me up.
He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the right
way to do it legally.’ I put a commission together with judge
[Michael] Mukasey, with congressman [Mike] McCaul,
Pete King, whole group of other very expert lawyers on this
and what we did was we focused on—instead of religion—
danger. The areas of the world that create danger for us,
which is a factual basis, not a religious basis. Perfectly legal.
Perfectly sensible. And that’s what the ban is based on. It’s
not based on religion, it’s based on places where there are
substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into
our country.195
Giuliani’s comments have been repeatedly referenced as proof
of the Trump Administration’s intent to create a “Muslim ban.”196
the drop down box below the text box; then type “Muslim Ban” (quotations not
included) in the second text box; then select from the “Publication date” dropdown
“Specific date range…”; then enter date range January 27, 2017–February 27, 2017;
then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
194. Fox News, Judge Jeanine Pirro Rudy Giuliani FULL Interview January 28,
2017, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Judge Pirro & Rudy Giulani
Interview], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jb3fo6jGbo [https://perma.cc/
R7N4-HC2B]; see Loulla-Maw Eleftheriou-Smith, Donald Trump Asked Rudy Giuliani
How to ‘Legally’ Create ‘Muslim Ban’, Claims Former New York Mayor, INDEPENDENT (Jan.
30, 2017, 10:21 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
donald-trump-muslim-ban-rudy-giuliani-how-legally-create-islam-us-immigration-en
try-visa-new-york-a7552751.html [https://perma.cc/JA7F-XJKY].
195. Eleftheriou-Smith, supra note 194; see Judge Pirro & Rudy Giulani Interview,
supra note 194.
196. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion For A Preliminary Injunction And/Or
Temporary Restraining Order of the Executive Order & Memorandum of Law In
Support Thereof at 7, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp.3d 539
(D. Md. Mar. 11, 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC) (“[T]wo days after the original
Executive Order was issued, Rudolph Giuliani, an advisor to President Trump,
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They have also allowed the courts to look beyond the four corners
of the Executive Order when determining if an Establishment Clause
argument would succeed on the merits.197 Additionally, the media’s
reporting on Trump campaign events, where Candidate Trump
promised a “complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States,” and tweets by the President expressing anti-Muslim
sentiment have been used to support an Establishment Clause claim
against the Travel Ban.198 Even after the Trump Administration
issued revised versions of the Travel Ban on March 6, 2017 and
September 28, 2017 that were more facially neutral than the original
January 27, 2017, Executive Order, these earlier comments continue
to be cited in ongoing litigation as evidence of the President’s true
intent in implementing the ban.199
While the attorneys may have been able to present other
evidence in support of an Establishment Clause claim, the media
record of the contemporaneous comments of President Trump and
his associates clearly made it easier to establish their case.200 Between
the amount of coverage and the role of the press in exposing
evidence in support of an Establishment Clause claim, the media
continues to play an important part in shaping the outcome, to date,
in the ongoing Travel Ban litigation.201

stated that then-candidate Trump had asked Mr. Giuliani for help in ‘legally’
creating a ‘Muslim ban’; that in response, Mr. Giuliani and others decided to use
territory as a proxy; and that this idea was reflected in the signed Order.”).
197. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp.3d 539, 558–59 (D.
Md. Mar. 11, 2017).
198. E.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6–7, Washington v.
Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00141)
(containing allegations of statements made by presidential candidate Trump,
including a statement on December 7, 2017 calling for “a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”); see Ariane de Vogue, How Donald
Trump’s Tweets are Helping to Fight His Travel Ban, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017, 2:14 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/trump-twitter-travel-ban/index.html
[https://perma.cc/YZ7G-7N7A].
199. Ariane de Vogue, Judges in Travel Ban Case Concerned About Trump Tweets,
CNN (Dec. 8, 2017, 2:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/08/politics/travelban-trump-tweets/index.html [https://perma.cc/4YFU-MT4X].
200. Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1139 (D. Haw. 2017) (considering
previous comments made by President Trump and concluding that “the Court
emphasizes that its preliminary assessment rests on the peculiar circumstances and
specific historical record present[ed] here.”).
201. Michael D. Shear et al., Supreme Court Cancels Hearing on Previous Trump
Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
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In subsequent months, media coverage of the Travel Ban and
impact litigation challenging the two later versions of the Travel Ban
waned.202 Because the impact of newer versions of the Travel Ban is
playing out overseas at U.S. consular posts instead of in the airports,
it is difficult to hold the public’s attention on this issue.203
Nonetheless, as impact litigation challenging the third indefinite
version of the Travel Ban makes its way through the courts, media
coverage and public engagement will be critical to illuminate the
impact on nationals of the named countries and harm to their
relatives and business ties in the U.S.
B.

Border Security Executive Order and Department of Homeland Security
Memorandum

While it is clear that increased media coverage can shape the
course of impact litigation challenging Presidential executive action
on immigration, what happens when that coverage is lacking? Unlike
the Travel Ban and the Border Security Executive Order, subsequent
09/25/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/TM9
T-LY8N] (discussing critics of the Travel Ban “point[ing] to Mr. Trump’s history of
calling for a ban on Muslim entry into the United States”).
202. Between February 28, 2017 and December 1, 2017, a total of 17,062 stories
were published by U.S. News Sources about the Travel Ban. PROQUEST,
https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Database” hyperlink; then expand “Global
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”;
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Travel Ban” OR “Muslim Ban”
(quotations included) in the second text box; then select from the “Publication
date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date range February 28, 2017–
December 1, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018). The
total number of news stories over this nine month period was only slightly higher
than the number of stories (12,589) published about the Travel Ban in the one
month period immediately after the first Travel Ban was signed by President Trump.
Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and
check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow
“Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Travel Ban” (quotations not included) OR
“Muslim Ban” (quotations included) in the second text box; then select from the
“Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date range January
27, 2017–February 27, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20,
2018).
203. See, e.g., U.S. has Begun Fully Implementing Trump Travel Ban: State Dept.,
REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2017, 11:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaimmigration-ban/u-s-has-begun-fully-implementing-trump-travel-ban-state-dept-id
USKBN1E22CB [https://perma.cc/NXC2-PAE6] (discussing President Trump’s
newer Executive Order as “calling for ‘enhancing vetting capabilities’ at U.S.
embassies and consulates overseas”).
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agency actions on the border and the impact on asylum seekers
received comparatively little media attention and were allowed to
move forward with minimal pushback.204
Nearly one year into the Trump Administration, legal advocates
began filing suits against the Trump Administration, challenging
actions and policies by the Administration implemented under the
January 2017 Border Security Executive Order.205 Nevertheless, one
cannot help but wonder if these legal challenges would have
commenced earlier had there been more national media coverage
of the Trump Administration’s efforts to implement the Border
Security Executive Order along with other actions against Central
American asylum seekers on the southern border.
1. Impact to Central American Asylum Seekers
During his first week in office, President Trump issued the
Border Security Executive Order, setting forth a number of policy
goals and administrative changes governing immigration
enforcement along the southern border.206
Section 1 of the Border Security Executive Order states that the
purpose of the order is to “direct executive departments and
agencies . . . to deploy all lawful means to secure the Nation’s
southern border, to prevent further illegal immigration into the
United States, and to repatriate illegal aliens swiftly, consistently, and
humanely.”207 Yet, as the Obama Administration learned with its
initial response to the Central American Migrant Crisis, the swift
repatriation of apprehended aliens could be deemed unlawful if the

204. Harvard Releases Report on Effect of Trump’s Executive Orders on Asylum Seekers,
HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 8, 2017), https://today.law.harvard.edu/harvard-releasesfirst-report-effect-trumps-executive-orders-asylum-seekers/
[https://perma.cc/K3FH-CBQR] (“In the wake of the executive orders, media
attention has focused largely on the travel ban involving seven predominantly
Muslim nations, but the impact of the orders on asylum seekers from around the
world has received little attention.”).
205. Ryan Devereaux, U.S. Illegally Denying Immigrants Their Right to Seek Asylum
at the Mexican Border, According to Lawsuit, INTERCEPT (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:38 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/11/16/immigration-asylum-seekers-denied-borde
r-entry-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/3S2W-AA8P] (discussing legal actions filed
against the Trump Administration in California and Texas stemming from the
Border Security Executive Order).
206. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
207. Id. at 8793 (emphasis added).
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government denies an individual the opportunity to pursue an
asylum claim.208
Five sections of the Border Security Executive Order contain
language that, if enacted as written, would have a significant negative
impact on Central American asylum seekers. The first of these,
sections 5 and 6, call for expanded detention of apprehended
immigrants pending outcome of their removal proceedings209 and
allocation of resources to construct new detention facilities along the
southern border.210 Section 7 directs DHS to return individuals
apprehended to the last country of passage while their removal
proceedings are waiting to be heard by an immigration judge.211
Even more problematic, section 11 aims at eliminating “the abuse of
parole and asylum provisions,” calling for more stringent screening
of asylum seekers during the credible fear assessment and imposing
significant limitations on parole of asylum seekers who have passed
their credible fear screenings.212 Lastly, section 13 directs the
Attorney General to “establish prosecution guidelines . . . to ensure
that Federal prosecutors accord a high priority to prosecutions of
offenses having a nexus to the southern border,” including increased
criminal prosecution for illegal entry.213
On February 20, 2017, several weeks after the issuance of the
Border Security Executive Order, DHS issued an implementation
memo (DHS Border Security Memo) providing guidance on how the
agency should implement the Executive Order.214 The DHS Border
208. As noted above, on August 22, 2014, at the height of the Central American
Migrant Crisis, the ACLU, AIC, NLG, and NILC filed a class action suit, M.S.P.C. v.
Johnson, on behalf of mothers detained at the Artesia detention facility. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text. The suit alleged that the government violated
mothers’ due process rights during initial asylum screenings and failed to properly
consider their asylum claims during the credible fear process. See supra note 69–70
and accompanying text. This lawsuit was dismissed by motion of the plaintiffs after
DHS properly addressed the alleged due process violations and closed the Artesia
Detention Center. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
209. Id. at 8795.
210. Id. at 8794–95.
211. Id. at 8795.
212. Id. at 8795–96.
213. See id. at 8796.
214. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection,
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements Policies 1 (2017) [hereinafter DHS Border Security Memo],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing
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Security Memo provided further guidance on procedures for asylum
screening, limits on parole, and increased prosecutions.215 It also
included new language describing the possible expansion of
expedited removal and measures limiting protections for
unaccompanied minors.216
With respect to asylum seekers, section I of the DHS Border
Security Memo sets forth a seemingly more stringent standard for
passing a credible fear interview, stating that “an alien must
demonstrate that there is a ‘significant possibility’ that the alien
could establish eligibility for asylum.”217 In its analysis of the Border
Security Executive Order and DHS Border Security Memo, the
Migration Policy Institute expressed concerns about the “significant
possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum” credible fear
standard, particularly for Central Americans, noting:
DHS also states that determinations should include
consideration of the statistical likelihood that the claim
would be granted by an immigration judge. Asylum
grant rates for Central Americans in immigration court
are among the lowest of any national-origin group . . . .
This . . . indicates that credible fear and reasonable fear
determination standards will be tightened, making
it more difficult for asylum seekers to lodge claims after
they are apprehended to the border.218
In contrast, the DHS Border Security Memo guidelines for
parole determinations and detention of asylum seekers are
considerably more moderate than the language contained in the
Border Security Executive Order.219 Of note, section A of the DHS
Border Security Memo confirmed that DHS would continue to
release individuals on parole “[w]hen required to do so by statute,

-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.p
df [https://perma.cc/MY3J-PES6].
215. See id. at 2–12.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 8 (quoting INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v)
(Supp. 2017)).
218. FAYE HIPSMAN & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, TRUMP
EXECUTIVE ORDER AND DHS IMPLEMENTATION MEMO ON BORDER ENFORCEMENT: A
BRIEF REVIEW (2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trump-executiveorder-and-dhs-implementation-memo-border-enforcement-brief-review [https://
perma.cc/MDR7-XWMT] (select “Download Brief”).
219. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017), with
DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214.
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or to comply with a binding settlement agreement or order issued by
a competent judicial or administrative authority.”220 This would allow
for the ongoing release of Central American family units, in
accordance with the Flores settlement. Additionally, section K of the
DHS Border Security Memo states that the 2009 Obama
Administration policy directive to grant parole to arriving aliens
seeking asylum who pass a credible fear of persecution screening and
pose no security, safety, or flight risk221 remains in effect pending
further changes or directives by the DHS Secretary.222
The additional sections of the DHS Border Security Memo
directly impacting Central Americans are sections L and M, relating
to the processing of unaccompanied minors. Section L of the DHS
Border Security Memo states that “[a]pproximately 60% of minors
initially determined to be ‘unaccompanied alien children’ are
placed in the care of one or more parents illegally residing in the
United States,” implying that unaccompanied minors placed in the
custody of a parent should not continue to be afforded protections
under TVPRA.223 Additionally, section M contains harsh language
against parents who facilitate the smuggling of their children to the
U.S. and directs ICE and CBP to “ensure the proper enforcement of
our immigration laws against any individual who—directly or
indirectly—facilitates the illegal smuggling or trafficking of an alien
child into the U.S.”224
Taken together, all of the proposed measures set forth in the
Border Security Executive Order and accompanying DHS Border
Security Memo have the potential to dramatically change the way
asylum seekers are processed along the southern border. Given the
large number of unaccompanied minors and family units from the
Northern Triangle apprehended along the southern border every
year, these measures have the potential to impact tens of thousands
of people fleeing violence and may dramatically decrease their
ability to present a successful asylum claim.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214, at 2.
See ICE 2009 DIRECTIVE 11002.1, supra note 39.
DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214, at 9–10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.

848

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:3

2. Disparate Level of Media Coverage of the Border Security Executive
Order
While a lack of appropriated congressional funds has prevented
the Border Security Executive Order goals of constructing a wall and
detention facilities along the border, other measures not requiring
funding or new regulations did move forward.225 Additionally, like
the Travel Ban, there are portions of the Border Security Executive
Order and actions taken by the Administration to implement these
directives that could be deemed unlawful if challenged in court.226
However, in contrast to the Travel Ban, impact litigation challenging
the Trump Administration’s actions along the border has been slow
to follow.
One possible reason why there has been limited impact
litigation challenging the Trump Administration’s implementation
of the Border Security Executive Order is the limited media coverage
highlighting potentially unlawful conduct at the border. Unlike
press coverage of the Travel Ban, with over 12,000 stories published
in the month after it was issued,227 only 626 stories were published in

225. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing the mandate of hiring of “5,000 additional
Border Patrol Agents” and “500 Air & Marine Agents/Officers”).
226. See ACLU, EXECUTIVE ORDER “BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS” 2 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/executive-orderborder-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements [https://perma.cc/
WL7Y-T86R].
The implementation of this EO may result in the removal of migrants
without due process or judicial recourse; more frequent detention of
migrants (including families with young children) without
individualized determination and when not justified by exceptional
circumstances; the separation of families without regard for their ties to
the United States or the best interests of the child; an increased
likelihood that undocumented individuals will be the victims of crime
and violence, and denied equal access to justice due to fear of seeking
assistance from local police; and the denial of a meaningful opportunity
to make an asylum claim, resulting in violations of U.S. non-refoulement
obligations.
Id.
227. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then
type “Travel Ban” (quotations not included) OR “Muslim Ban” (quotations
included) in first text box; then select from the “Publication date” dropdown
“Specific date range…”; then enter date range January 27, 2017–February 27, 2017;
then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
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U.S. media sources about the Border Security Executive Order
between January 25, 2017 and February 25, 2017.228
Additionally, since January 2017, much of the coverage of this
Executive Order has centered on tough rhetoric by DHS and DOJ
officials instead of actions by the Trump Administration along the
southern border.229 Whether intentional or not, focusing on the
speech versus the actions of government officials at the border
effectively created a smoke screen, diverting attention away from
questionable actions by officials that could be challenged in court.
3. Tough Rhetoric on Border Security Aimed at Creating a Deterrent
Effect
One clear objective of the Border Security Executive Order and
DHS Border Security Memo was to create a deterrent effect to
discourage future illegal border crossings along the southern
border.230 Furthering this goal, then DHS Secretary John Kelly and
other high-ranking DHS officials made a series of statements in the
spring of 2017 indicating that DHS would be implementing new
policies first outlined in the Border Security Executive Order and
DHS Border Security Memo.231
One early example of this harsh rhetoric from Secretary Kelly
was the proposed change in the processing of family units
apprehended at the border. In a March 7, 2017, interview with CNN,
Secretary Kelly confirmed a previous statement by a senior DHS
official on March 4, 2017 that the agency was considering separating
228. Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”;
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Border Security” and
“Executive Order” (quotations included) in the first text box; then select from the
“Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date range January
25, 2017–February 25, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June 20,
2018).
229. See Jessica Schneider & David Shortell, Sessions’ Agenda at DOJ Reflects
Trump’s, Despite Rocky Relationship, CNN (Jan. 5, 2018, 6:15 PM), http://www.cnn.co
m/2017/12/31/politics/doj-year-end-recap/index.html [https://perma.cc/4NSR4ALA] (discussing Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ public statements committing to
be tough on crime).
230. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
231. Press Release, John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement on
President’s Executive Order (March 6, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2017/03/06/statement-secretary-homeland-security-john-kelly-presidents-executiv
e-order-signed [https://perma.cc/ASX2-5TB2].
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children from their parents at the border.232 This statement marked
a significant departure from the policy of processing parents and
children apprehended at the border as family units.233 Secretary
Kelly justified the proposed change in policy because of its deterrent
effect, stating, in part, “I’m considering [separating children from
their parents], in order to deter more movement along this terribly
dangerous network.”234
Secretary Kelly’s statements on the possible separation of
parents and minor children garnered considerable attention from
the press. Between March 4, 2017, the date this proposed change was
first announced by a senior DHS official, and April 30, 2017, 652
stories were published in U.S. media sources.235 Following this
increased scrutiny by the press, Secretary Kelly backtracked his
earlier remarks at a meeting with Senate Democrats on March 26,
2017, confirming that the DHS would not separate mothers and
children at the border unless there was an extenuating reason, such
as illness.236
On December 21, 2017, the Washington Post reported that the
Trump Administration was once again considering separating
parents and minor children apprehended at the southern border.237

232. Danielle Diaz, Kelly: DHS is Considering Separating Undocumented Children
From Their Parents at the Border, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017, 7:33 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/06/politics/john-kelly-separating-children-fromparents-immigration-border/index.html [https://perma.cc/5CM9-SD5S].
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. PROQUEST, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then
type “Kelly” (quotations not included) AND “Family” (quotations not included)
AND “Homeland Security” (quotations included) in the first text box; then select
from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date
range March 4, 2017–April 30, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited June
20, 2018).
236. Tal Kopan, Kelly says DHS Won’t Separate Families at the Border, CNN, (Mar.
29, 2017, 10:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/politics/border-familiesseparation-kelly/index.html [https://perma.cc/6UQM-XQK2].
237. Nick Miroff, To Curb Illegal Border Crossings, Trump Administration Weighs New
Measures Targeting Families, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/to-curb-illegal-border-crossings-trump-administ
ration-weighs-new-measures-targeting-families/2017/12/21/19300dc2-e66c-11e79ec2-518810e7d44d_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_dhs 610pm%3Ahome
page%2Fstory&utm_term=.19633974c6ec [https://perma.cc/PLH6-59E4].
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This proposal was once again met with considerable outcry, with a
number of published news reports and opinion pieces criticizing this
proposed action.238 While DHS has not issued a denial in response
to the Washington Post story, to date, current DHS Secretary Kirstjen
Nielsen has not approved this proposal or any other changes to the
processing of family units apprehended at the border.239
Another member of the Trump Administration known for his
public statements supporting stronger border security is Attorney
General Jeff Sessions.240 On October 12, 2017, Attorney General
Sessions delivered a controversial speech to the Executive Office of
Immigration Review in Falls Church, Virginia alleging rampant
abuse of asylum laws.241 In his remarks, Attorney General Sessions
claimed many immigrants apprehended at the border present a false
claim for asylum as a means to enter the country, stating:
We have a generous asylum policy that is meant to protect
those who, through no fault of their own, cannot co-exist
in their home country no matter where they go because of
persecution based on fundamental things like their
religion or nationality. Unfortunately, this system is
currently subject to rampant abuse and fraud. And as this
system becomes overloaded with fake claims, it cannot deal
effectively with just claims. . . . The system is being gamed.
238. See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, Deterring Illegal Immigration by Separating Parents and
Children, ATLANTIC (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/12/trumps-plan-to-deter-immigrants-from-coming-to-the-unitedstates/54922
1/ [https://perma.cc/28KS-T632]; Elizabeth Oglesby, Opinion, Taking Away Their
Children Won’t Stop Central American Border Crossers, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2018, 5:30 PM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/367115-taking-away-their-children-won
t-stop-central-american-border-crossers [https://perma.cc/FY7J-3RJG].
239. See Alvarez, supra note 238.
240. See, e.g., Seung Min Kim & Josh Gerstein, What Jeff Sessions Thinks About
Immigration, Police & Terrorism, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/01/jeff-sessions-views-attorney-general-233383 [https://perma.cc/2E3
U-78GM]; Adam Serwer, Jeff Session’s Unqualified Praise for a 1924 Immigration Law,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
[https://perma.cc/42X
22017/01/jeff-sessions-1924-immigration/512591/
3LT6]; Sen. Jeff Sessions, Opinion: America Needs to Curb Immigration Flows, WASH.
POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/slow-theimmigration-wave/2015/04/09/c6d8e3d4-dd52-11e4-a5001c5bb1d8ff6a_story.htm
l?nid&utm_term=.04d5fda0128d [https://perma.cc/7DR9-R5ZX].
241. Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to Executive Office
for Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review
[https://perma.cc/YU9A-CGUB].
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The credible fear process was intended to be a lifeline for
persons facing serious persecution. But it has become an
easy ticket to illegal entry into the United States.242
Attorney General Sessions was also critical of immigration
attorneys who represent immigrants apprehended at the border in
their credible fear interviews, stating: “We also have dirty
immigration lawyers who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully
present clients to make false claims of asylum providing them with
the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear process.”243
These remarks were covered in a number of major news
publications, including the Washington Post244 and the Wall Street
Journal,245 and drew sharp criticism from immigration attorneys and
advocates.246 However, this tough rhetoric has not yet led to any
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Sari Horiwitz, Sessions Calls on Congress to Tighten Rules for Asylum Seekers,
WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-se
curity/sessions-calls-on-congress-to-tighten-rules-for-people-seekingasylum/2017/1
0/12/9a1c6c3e-af56-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html [https://perma.cc/3KS
3-H28R]; Nicole Lewis, Fact Checker: Sessions Claim that ‘Dirty Immigration Lawyers’
Encourage Clients to Cite ‘Credible Fear’, WASH. POST. (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/10/26/sessions-cl
aim-that-dirty-immigration-lawyers-encourage-clients-to-cite-credible-fear/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2TJL-4CF7]; Nickole Miller, Letter to the Editor: Jeff Sessions Claims About
Asylum Seekers Were Wildly Inaccurate, WASH. POST. (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeff-sessionss-claims-about-asylum-see
kers-were-wildly-inaccurate/2017/10/15/23dd83c6-b020-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22
_story.html [https://perma.cc/CV9Y-3CBR];.
245. See Alicia A. Caldwell, Sessions Expands on Trump Plan to Toughen Asylum
Process, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sessionsexpands-on-trump-plan-to-toughen-asylum-process-1507847158 [https://perma.cc
/2MWM-39YD]; Aruna Viswanatha, Jeff Sessions to Face Questions on Immigration, Other
Contentious Issues, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/jeff-sessions-set-to-face-questions-on-immigration-ot her-contentious-issues1508324401 [https://perma.cc/S8CJ-G673].
246. See, e.g., Attorney General Derides the Role of Due Process in the American
Asylum System, AILA (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/pressreleases/2017/aila-attorney-general-derides-the-role-of-due [https://perma.cc/Z
S6D-FRX7]; Amanda Holpuch, Leading Immigration Lawyer Condemns Sessions’ Attack
on Asylum System, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2017/oct/13/jeff-sessions-asylum-immigration-annaluisa-padilla [htt
ps://perma.cc/2C94-7YNR]; Stephen W. Manning & Michelle Mendez, Trump,
Sessions Attack Immigration Lawyers in Latest Affront to Rule of Law, THE HILL (Oct. 18,
2017, 6:40 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/ immigration/355958-trumpsessionss-latest-affront-to-rule-of-law-attack-immigration-lawyers [https://perma.cc/
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major significant policy changes in these areas. To date, the official
policy of DHS is to process parents and minor children apprehended
at the border as family units,247 and the Trump Administration has
not reinstituted a formal policy of long-term family detention.
Additionally, while issues continue to arise with prompt release of
detainees in compliance with Judge Gee’s July 2015 order, the
majority of family units who undergo and pass a credible fear
screening at a family detention center are quickly processed and
released in compliance with the Flores settlement.248 Although the
Administration has criticized the “loopholes” created by the TVPRA,
DHS has not taken any steps to eliminate protections under the
TVPRA for unaccompanied minors who reunite with a parent in the
U.S.249 Furthermore, according to the most recent available statistics,
nearly 80 percent of immigrants apprehended at the border who
underwent a credible fear interview had a positive finding of credible
fear.250
While DHS never implemented a formal policy of separating
family units apprehended at the border, Secretary Kelly’s comments,
combined with the language in the Border Security Executive Order
and DHS Border Security Memo, created a temporary deterrent
effect. FY 2017 saw a significant decrease in apprehensions along the

7Y85-XDRJ].
247. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES
BORDER PATROL SOUTHWEST FAMILY UNIT SUBJECT AND UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN
CHILDREN APPREHENSIONS FISCAL YEAR 2016, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016
[https://perma.cc/7HTDHN3E] (last visited June 20, 2018).
248. In a June 27, 2017, order granting, in part, Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce,
Judge Gee referenced evidence presented by the United States government,
confirming that 95 percent of individuals detained at the family detention centers
in Dilley, Texas, Karnes, Texas, and Berks County, Pennsylvania were released
within 20 days of detention. See Flores v. Sessions, CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx)
(C.D.C.A. June 27, 2017).
249. See Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting a Report on Immigration
Principles and Policies, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 734 (Oct. 8, 2017).
250. According to recent statistics published by the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services Asylum Division, in FY 2017, 47,833 of the 62,757 cases
(76.3%) that underwent a credible fear screening had a positive finding of credible
fear. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CREDIBLE FEAR
WORKLOAD SUMMARY–FY 2017 TOTAL CASELOAD, https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/P
ED_CredibleFearandReasonableFearStatisticsandNationalityReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WRQ4-3JFN] (last visited June 20, 2018).
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southern border, with a dramatic decrease in apprehensions
between February and June 2017.251 April 2017, in particular,
marked a five-year low in apprehensions, with only 15,766 total
apprehensions—roughly one-third of the apprehensions in April
2016.252 By the fall of 2017, the deterrent effect had worn off, and
southern border apprehensions were once again on the rise.253
Considering that DHS has not yet implemented the procedures to
separate parents and minor children apprehended as family units on
the border, it is entirely possible that DHS hoped the recently leaked
reports would recreate the deterrent effect seen in third quarter of
FY 2017.
C.

Less Publicized Actions by the Trump Administration on the Southern
Border

Those who were apprehended at the southern border in FY
2017 ultimately faced actions that, although less publicized, were just
as harsh as the policies outlined in the Border Security Executive
Order that never came to fruition. The sections below discuss three

251. FY 2017 saw the lowest number of Border Patrol apprehensions along the
southern border, an indicator of total number of illegal crossings, in modern history
with 303,916 total apprehensions for the year. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP SW. BORDER TOTAL Apprehensions/Inadmissibles
Statistics, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration [https://per
ma.cc/265J-U3AE] (last visited June 20, 2018). Apprehensions decreased
significantly in the five-month period from February to June 2017 with only 97,506
apprehensions. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SOUTHWEST BORDER MIGRATION FY 2017, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/swborder-migration-fy2017 [https://perma.cc/RN7L-8AAS] (last visited June 20,
2018). By way of comparison, in FY 2016, there were a total of 408,870
apprehensions along the southern border, with 234,092 apprehensions between
February and June of 2016. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., U.S. BORDER PATROL APPREHENSIONS/SEIZURE STATISTICS–FISCAL YEAR 2016, at
4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017Jan/USBP%20Stats%20FY2016%20sector%20profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78
P-Q5YE].
252. In April 2016, there were a total of 48,502 apprehensions along the
southern border. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
BORDER PATROL APPREHENSIONS/SEIZURE STATISTICS–FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4 (Jan.
2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Jan/USB
P%20Stats%20FY2016%20sector%20profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/W78P-Q5YE].
In April 2017, there were a total of 15,766. Id.
253. By FY 2017 Q4, border apprehensions were on the rise, with a total of
86,726 apprehensions between July 2017 and September 2017. Id.
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of the actions taken by DHS Officials as part of the agency’s efforts
to implement the Border Security Executive Order. Furthermore,
they examine how the lack of media coverage and public
engagement may have shaped legal advocacy and impacted litigation
challenging these measures.
1. Blanket Denial of Parole to Asylum Seekers
One troubling issue that has emerged along the southern
border and other points of entry is the mass detention of asylum
seekers who have established a credible fear of persecution.254
Individuals without a valid visa who turn themselves in to a CBP or
Border Patrol agent at a U.S. port of entry in order to request asylum
are considered “arriving aliens,” and are subject to mandatory
detention under INA § 235.255 However, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5,
arriving aliens may be, on a case-by-case basis, released on parole due
to “urgent humanitarian reasons” or “a significant public benefit,”
provided the aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of
absconding.256 Since 2009, the Obama Administration policy
directive has been the official policy of DHS governing whether
asylum seekers are released on parole.257 This policy states that the
detention of arriving aliens who pass a credible fear interview is not
in the public interest and recommends these asylum seekers be

254. HUM. RTS. FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN: INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS 8–13 (2016) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN],
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZL8F-GBJF].
255. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2017).
Under INA § 235, any arriving alien who is not admitted or paroled into the U.S.,
including asylum seekers who claim a credible fear of persecution at a U.S. port of
entry, are ineligible for release on bond and subject to mandatory detention until
an immigration judge issues a final determination to grant or deny asylum. See INA
§ 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2017). Conversely, individuals who
enter the U.S. unlawfully without inspection who are apprehended within U.S.
territory shortly after entry are eligible for a bond hearing before an immigration
judge and release on bond after establishing credible fear of persecution under 8
CFR § 1003.19. See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 CFR § 1003.19; see also Allegra
Love, A Very Complicated Legal Explanation About ICE and Immigrants and Parole,
MEDIUM (June 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@allegralove1/a-very-complicatedlegal-explanation-about-ice-and-immigrants-and-parole-ba9db3fe947a
[https://perma.cc/956U-TVMX].
256. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (2017).
257. ICE 2009 DIRECTIVE 11002.1, supra note 39.
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released on parole.258 While the number of asylum seekers released
on parole decreased following the 2014 Central American Migrant
Crisis, many asylum applicants continued to be released on parole
during the last two years of the Obama Administration after passing
a credible fear interview.259
Although the DHS Border Security Memo indicated that the
2009 Obama Administration policy directive remained in effect with
respect to parole of asylum applicants who had passed a credible fear
interview,260 reports from detained asylum seekers and attorneys
indicate this is not the case.261 On the contrary, the DHS under the
Trump Administration appears to have adopted a blanket policy
where it will no longer release asylum seekers on parole and instead
will detain asylum applicants indefinitely while their asylum case is
pending before an immigration judge.262 This change in policy,
triggered by the Border Security Executive Order, has led to the
prolonged detention of asylum seekers, creating serious barriers to
due process (particularly access to legal representation) in
immigration proceedings.263 A recent report by Human Rights First
258. Id. at ¶ 6.2.
259. HUM. RTS. FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 254, at 8–9, 13. The
release of arriving alien asylum seekers who had a positive finding of credible fear
decreased significantly after the Central American Minor Crisis in 2014. Id. at 13. In
2012, 80 percent of arriving asylum seekers who passed their credible fear interview
were released on parole, compared to the first three quarters of FY 2015 when only
47 percent of arriving alien asylum seekers were released on bond. Id.
260. See DHS Border Security Memo, supra note 214, at 8–9.
261. See HUM. RTS. FIRST, JUDGE AND JAILER: ASYLUM SEEKERS DENIED PAROLE IN
WAKE OF TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDER 6 (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. FIRST,
JUDGE AND JAILER], https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrfjudge-and-jailer-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK4R-M6V7].
262. In a September 2017 report, Human Rights First found that since the
Border Security Executive Order and the DHS Border Security Memo were issued:
ICE’s implementation of parole for arriving asylum seekers has shifted
in many detention facilities across the country. In these detention
locations, eligible asylum seekers were sometimes released from
detention on parole during the end of the Obama Administration. Now
they are rarely, if ever, released on parole.
Id.
263. A 2017 Human Rights First report raised concerns that increased detention
and directives in the DHS Border Security Memo to expedite asylum claims at
detention facilities near the southern border “could deprive detained asylum
seekers and other immigrants of the chance to secure legal counsel and gather
evidence” in support of their asylum claim. HUM. RTS. FIRST, TILTED JUSTICE:
BACKLOGS GROW WHILE FAIRNESS SHRINKS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS 4
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also found that in some jurisdictions asylum applicants voluntarily
withdrew their asylum application and accepted a removal order
because they did not want to be detained in jail-like conditions
indefinitely.264 More recently, news outlets published a December
14, 2017, DHS policy directive authorizing the indefinite detention
of pregnant women.265 This change marks a major shift from the
previous DHS policy to not detain pregnant women—save for cases
of extraordinary circumstances—and to release pregnant women on
parole.266
While widespread denial of parole for arriving aliens seeking
asylum has been commonplace since the Border Security Executive
Order was first issued, no legal challenges were filed against this
policy until July 28, 2017, approximately six months after President
Trump signed the Executive Order.267 On this date, the New York
Civil Liberties Union and IRAP filed a class action suit—on behalf of
arriving alien asylum seekers detained at the Buffalo Federal
Detention Facility in Bativa, New York—challenging DHS’s practice
of indiscriminately denying parole to detainees at the facility.268
In their amended petition and motion for injunctive relief,
Plaintiffs alleged that DHS officials had failed to follow agency
procedure outlined in the 2009 policy directive when making parole
determinations for asylum seekers who had passed a credible fear
determination.269 In support of their complaint, Plaintiffs cited
(Sept. 2017), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-tiltedjustice-final%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PFR-V6B9].
264. HUM. RTS. FIRST, JUDGE AND JAILER, supra note 261, at 4.
265. Rafael Bernal, ICE Will Detain Pregnant Women, Ending Previous Policy, THE
HILL (Mar. 29, 2018), http://thehill.com/latino/380827-ice-will-detain-pregnantwomen-ending-previous-policy [https://perma.cc/N8WG-6MKK].
266. See Memorandum from Thomas Homan, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to Field Office Directors et. al. (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/11032.2_Id
entificationMonitoringPregnantDetainees.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ87-AE9A].
267. See Kimberly J. Winbush, Issuance of Presidential Executive Orders Concerning
Immigration or Immigrants, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 2 (2017) (discussing cases
addressing challenges and/or interpretations of presidential executive orders that
relate to immigration and related issues such as rights of aliens or citizenship or
limitaitons on the issuance of passports and visas).
268. See generally Lawsuit Challenges Unlawful Detention of Asylum-Seekers at Buffalo
Immigration Jail, ACLU (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/lawsuit-challe
nges-unlawful-detention-asylum-seekers-buffalo-immigration-jail [https://perma.
cc/WR49-37K2].
269. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Complaint
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statistics offered by DHS showing that between January and July
2017, parole grant rates at the Bativa facility plummeted from 50
percent to between 12–14 percent.270 On November 17, 2017, Judge
Elizabeth A. Wolford in the Western District of New York granted
the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the
government’s motion to dismiss.271 Under the order, asylum seekers
are to be given a parole interview with an immigration officer,
provided with an explanation for their parole decision, and
informed that they can seek reconsideration if parole is initially
denied.272 The injunction also provides asylum seekers who have
already had their parole denied with the opportunity to have their
parole requests readjudicated,273 and orders bond hearings for those
detained at Batavia for six months or more.274 However, unlike the
preliminary injunctions that blocked enforcement of the Travel Ban
nationwide, Judge Wolford’s order is limited to the Western District
of New York.275
2. Increase in Criminal Prosecution of Asylum Seekers as Illegal
Entrants and Use of Criminal Prosecution for Immigration
Violations to Separate Family Units
Another enforcement goal set forth in the Border Security
Executive Order was increased criminal prosecution for
immigration violations.276 Though criminal prosecution for
immigration violations has accounted for a large number of total
federal prosecutions annually for at least a decade, the Trump
Administration has claimed to prioritize the DOJ’s efforts to
criminally prosecute immigration violations.277
for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 23, Abdi v. Duke, 2017 WL 5599521 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 2017) (No. 17-cv-0721-EAW).
270. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 5, Abdi v. Duke, 2017 WL 5599521
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-0721-EAW).
271. Abdi v. Duke, 2017 WL 5599521, at *29 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017).
272. Id. at *28.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
277. While the Trump Administration did prioritize prosecution for
immigration violations, the total number of prosecutions and convictions for
criminal immigration violations was approximately 14 percent lower in FY 2017 than
FY 2016. See Criminal Immigration Prosecutions Down 14% in FY 2017, TRAC REPORTS
(Dec. 6, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/494/[https://perma.cc/
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After the Bush Administration established the “Operation
Streamline” program in 2005,278 criminal prosecution for illegal
entry (a federal misdemeanor) and illegal reentry (a federal felony)
have accounted for a significant percentage of total annual
prosecutions by the DOJ.279 Prosecution for illegal entry and reentry
peaked during the Obama Administration with nearly 100,000
criminal convictions in 2013.280 Toward the end of the Obama
Administration, between FY 2014 and FY 2016, criminal prosecution
of immigration violations decreased281 and enforcement focused
primarily on prosecuting those who reentered the U.S. after prior
removal.282
On April 11, 2017, several months President Trump signed the
Border Security Executive Order, Attorney General Sessions issued
HQ2J-7YDW]. In FY 2017, there were a total of 59,910 prosecutions for criminal
immigration violations and in FY 2016 there were a total of 69,636 criminal
immigration prosecutions, including 64,297 prosecutions for illegal entry and
reentry. See id.; see also Immigration Now 52 Percent of all Federal Immigration Prosecutions,
TRAC REPORTS (Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter TRAC REPORT FY 2016],
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446/ [https://perma.cc/7M95-8WVT]. The
reduction in the number of prosecutions and convictions for illegal reentry and
illegally entry is likely due to the significantly lower number of apprehensions along
the southern border in FY 2017. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
278. Operation Streamline was launched in December 2005 by the Bush
Administration. See Bryan Schatz, A Day in the “Assembly-Line” Court That Prosecutes 70
Border Crossers in 2 Hours, MOTHER JONES (July 21, 2017, 6:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/07/a-day-in-the-assembly-line-courtthat-sentences-46-border-crossers-in-2-hours/# [https://perma.cc/5MJ9-KZW5].
Under the program, DHS designated target enforcement areas within a Border
Patrol sector and referred virtually all apprehended unauthorized persons in these
areas for speedy prosecution for the misdemeanor crime of illegal entry or the
felony crime of illegal reentry. Id. Since implementation of Operation Streamline,
convictions for illegal entry and illegal reentry have skyrocketed, accounting for a
majority of federal criminal convictions. Id.
279. See At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 2013,
TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/ [https://perma
.cc/P4S7-8G9R] (last visited June 20, 2018).
280. Id.
281. See TRAC REPORT FY 2016, supra note 277.
282. Under previous Administrations, many individuals who were prosecuted
after reentry were initially charged with the more serious felony charge of illegal
reentry, but were allowed to plead guilty to the reduced charge of illegal entry, a
petty misdemeanor. See Despite Rise in Felony Charges, Most Immigration Convictions
Remain Misdemeanors, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/
356/ [https://perma.cc/L9S4-W5UB] (last visited June 20, 2018); see also Schatz,
supra note 278.
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a policy memorandum directing federal prosecutors to prioritize
prosecution of criminal immigration violations.283 In particular, the
DOJ policy memorandum directed prosecutors to pursue felony
charges for those reentering the U.S. and to resume criminal
prosecution against first-time entrants.284
In the months following the DOJ policy memorandum,
prosecutions for illegal entry and reentry increased dramatically. By
May 2017, criminal prosecutions had increased by 27 percent,285 and
by June 2017, they had increased by another 18 percent.286 FY 2017
also saw aggressive prosecution of first-time entrants, including
asylum seekers.287 Border Patrol often apprehended and referred
these entrants to the DOJ for criminal prosecution before the
entrants had undergone credible fear screening.288 There were also
reports that many individuals who had been criminally convicted for
illegal entry were processed for removal by DHS before the
individuals were able to present their asylum claim.289

283. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to all Federal Prosecutors,
Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download [https://perm
a.cc/GT5Z-H9YW].
284. Id.; see Astrid Galvan, More Border Crossers Prosecuted in ‘New Era’ of
Enforcement, CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 5, 2017, 1:09 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/nationworld/ct-border-crossing-prosecutions-20171105-story.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/2GT7-DG5K].
285. Immigration Prosecutions for May 2017, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlymay17/fil/ [https://perma.cc/95PBDLDM] (last visited June 20, 2018) (stating that the number of “new immigration
prosecutions . . . . is up 26.8 percent over the previous month”).
286. Immigration Prosecutions for June 2017, TRAC REPORTS, https://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjun17/fil/ [https://perma.cc/HM4QFZJW] (last visited June 20, 2018) (“[D]uring June 2017 the government reported
5508 new immigration prosecutions . . . up 18.4 percent over the previous month.”).
287. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. BORDER
PATROL’S TUCSON SECTOR PROSECUTING FIRSTTIME OFFENDERS (July 13, 2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/us-border-patrol-s-tucson-sec
tor-prosecuting-first-time-offenders [https://perma.cc/Z6D6-7JCX].
288. HUM. RTS. FIRST, THE RISE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 2
(2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-criminal-prosecut
ion-of-asylum-seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9XR-EJNU] (stating that in Tucson,
“clients report having a fear to return to their home countries or intend to seek
asylum, but Streamline judges routinely tell attorneys that their clients must first be
criminally prosecuted and serve their prison sentences.”).
289. Prosecuting and removing asylum seekers before they have an opportunity
to pursue their asylum claims potentially violate the United States’ non-refoulement
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Even more troubling, in November 2017, the Houston
Chronicle confirmed twenty-two instances in which the DOJ and the
DHS used criminal prosecution for immigration violations to
separate family units entering the United States to seek asylum.290
Federal public defenders and legal advocates state that this number
is likely much higher.291 In one case, Nayron Pineda, who fled
Venezuela in May 2017 with his wife and fifteen-year-old daughter,
handed the Border Patrol agent paperwork to request asylum when
he and his family were apprehended.292 Instead of referring their
case for a credible fear screening and processing them as a family
unit, Mr. Pineda’s fifteen-year-old daughter was transferred to ORR
custody while he and his wife were prosecuted for illegal entry.293
After serving their sentence, the couple was transferred to an
immigration detention facility to make their case for asylum.294
During this time, Pineda and his wife were denied custody of their
daughter, who was eventually released to the custody of her aunt.295

obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, and 1967 Protocol that prohibit
returning an individual to a country where they would face persecution. See
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
art. 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]
(“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”).
290. Lomi Kriel, Trump Moves to End ‘Catch and Release’, Prosecuting Parents and
Removing Children who Cross Border, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 25, 2017) [hereinafter
Kriel, Trump Moves to End ‘Catch and Release’], http://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-moves-to-end-catch-and-release-1238
3666.php [https://perma.cc/S5QE-4S4U].
291. A November 25, 2017 Houston Chronicle story notes that “[f]ederal
defense attorneys across the southern border say they are fielding unprecedented
requests from migrant clients to find their children.” Id. The story also contains
quotes from Laura St. John, legal director of the Florence Project, an Arizona
nonprofit serving unaccompanied children, noting that St. John’s office had seen
nearly 100 cases of parents separated from their minor children when the parents
were prosecuted for illegal entry. Id.
292. Lomi Kriel, Streamlined: Trump Pressing for Mass Criminalization of Illegal
Border Crossers, HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.houston
chronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-pressing-for-mass-cri
minalization-of-11962046.php [https://perma.cc/VSF4-U2G6].
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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While it is unclear exactly how widespread the problem is, these
anecdotal reports sharply conflict with the DHS policy to not
separate family units that then DHS Secretary Kelly announced in
April 2017.296
To date, there has been one significant legal challenge to the
prosecution of parents apprehended and separated from their
minor children. On November 7, 2017, the Federal Public Defender
for the Western District of Texas in El Paso, Texas, filed a joint
motion on behalf of five defendants to dismiss federal misdemeanor
charges for illegal entry.297 In support of their motion, Defendants
argued that the government’s criminal prosecution of asylum
seekers, separation of asylum seekers from their minor children, and
failure to process asylum seekers and their children as family units
in compliance with the Flores settlement, violated their Due Process
rights.298 Despite expressing serious concerns about the increased
number of defendants prosecuted for misdemeanor illegal entry
who were separated from their children at the time of their arrest,299
U.S. Magistrate Judge Miguel Torres denied Defendants’ motion to
dismiss on November 27, 2017.300 The Federal Public Defender for
the Western District of Texas indicated the defendants would appeal
the ruling by Judge Torres.301
On December 11, 2017, eight organizations filed a formal
complaint with the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
and DHS Inspector General regarding the use of prosecution for
illegal reentry to separate family units apprehended at or near the
296. See Kriel, Trump Moves to End ‘Catch and Release’, supra note 290.
297. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support Thereof, United
States v. Dominguez Portillo, No. 17-MJ-4409-MAT (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2007).
298. Id. at *3.
299. In his November 1, 2017 Order, U.S. Magistrate Judge Torres noted:
The Court, in a number of recent illegal entry cases over the last several
months, has repeatedly been appraised of concerns voiced by defense
counsel and by defendants regarding their limited and often nonexistent lack of information about the well-being and whereabouts of
their minor children from whom they were separated at the time of their
arrest.
Order for Briefing, United States v. Dominguez Portillo, EP-17-MJ-4409-MAT, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017).
300. Lomi Kriel, El Paso Judge Denies Motion of Immigrant Parents Separated from
Children, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.chron.com/news/
houston-texas/houston/article/El-Paso-judge-denies-motion-of-immigrant-parents12387509.php [https://perma.cc/TR8S-JRWQ] (last visited June 20, 2018).
301. Id.
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U.S.-Mexico border.302 In the complaint, the Florence Immigration
and Refugee Rights Project, one of the signatory organizations,
identified 155 cases of family separation that had occurred as of late
October 2017, with most of these cases occurring during the late
summer and fall of 2017.303 Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service, another signatory organization that provides temporary
shelter and sponsor placement services for unaccompanied minors
in ORR custody, also reported a significant increase in minors who
were separated from a parent following apprehension at the border
in the last quarter of FY 2017.304 These reports from organizations
working on the ground to assist family units apprehended at the
border indicate that this issue may be more widespread than
originally thought.305
3. Customs and Border Protection and Border Patrol Officers
Turning Away Asylum Seekers at the Southern Border
While not specifically directed by the Border Security Executive
Order, another trend that has emerged involves CBP and Border
Patrol agents turning away those who present themselves at the
border to request asylum. According to a May 2017 report by Human
Rights First, after the election of President Trump and his signing of
the Border Security Executive Order, CBP agents have routinely
refused to process asylum seekers and, in some cases, claimed the
United States is no longer accepting asylum seekers.306

302. The eight organizations that filed the joint formal complaint were: Al Otro
Lado, American Immigration Council, American Immigration Lawyers Association,
Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, Kids in Need of Defense, Lutheran
Immigration & Refugee Service, Refugee & Immigrant Center for Education &
Legal Services, and Women’s Refugee Commission. Letter from Al Otro Lado et.
al., to Cameron Quinn, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Dept. of
Homeland Sec., and John V. Kelly, Acting Inspector General, Dept. of Homeland
Sec. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/general_litigation/family_separation_complaint.pdf [https://perma.
cc/DG89-SNXE].
303. Id. at 5–6.
304. Id. at 6.
305. Id. at 18.
306. See B. SHAW DRAKE ET AL., HUM. RTS. FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER
AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT ASYLUM SEEKERS 1 (May 2017), http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-line-report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/W48A-UMEJ].
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Some of the reported conduct by CBP and Border Patrol agents
is particularly egregious, and indicates that, under the Trump
Administration, officers feel emboldened to reject asylum applicants
presenting a claim of fear at the border, in violation of both U.S. and
international law.307 In several reported cases, CBP and Border
Patrol agents have told asylum seekers, “Trump says we don’t have to
let you in”308 and, “There’s no asylum here. We’re not granting
asylum.”309 In other cases, CBP and Border Patrol agents have
threatened to separate parents from their children if they pursue an
asylum claim.310 According to one attorney representing asylum
seekers on the U.S. border near Tijuana, “The tenor of interactions
with C.B.P. officers has veered toward the openly hostile following
[President Trump’s] election.”311
On July 12, 2017, the AIC and Center for Constitutional Rights
filed a class action lawsuit challenging CBP’s unlawful practice of
turning away asylum seekers who present themselves at a port of
entry along the U.S.-Mexico border.312 In support of their November
13, 2017, motion for class certification, Plaintiffs submitted affidavits
from the individual plaintiffs313 and nineteen asylum seekers314 who
had been turned back by a CBP officer after attempting to apply for
asylum at the border. The affidavits detailed unlawful conduct by the

307. The act of turning away an individual seeking protection on account of a
well-founded fear of persecution violates INA § 235, which requires the acceptance
and processing of asylum seeker with a credible fear of persecution apprehended at
the border. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 2017). It also
violates the United States’ treaty obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention,
and the 1967 Protocol. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 289; 1967 Protocol,
supra note 289.
308. B. SHAW DRAKE ET. AL., supra note 306.
309. Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, ‘No Asylum Here’: Some Say U.S. Border
Agents Rejected Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05
/03/us/asylum-border-customs.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/335C-P7LC].
310. Richard Gonzalez, Advocates Say Agents are Unlawfully Turning Away Asylum
Seekers at the Border, NPR NEWS (July 26, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/201
7/07/26/539496312/advocates-say-agents-are-unlawfully-turning-away-asylum-seek
ers-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/J93H-ZAR2].
311. Dickerson & Jordan, supra note 309.
312. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 1–3, Al Otro Lado v.
Duke, No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D.C.A. July 12, 2017).
313. Declaration of Abigail Doe in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion at 1–3, Al Otro
Lado v. Duke, No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D.C.A. Nov. 13, 2017).
314. Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion at 1–3, Al Otro Lado v. Duke,
No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D.C.A. Nov. 13, 2017).
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CBP officers, including falsely representing to individuals that
asylum is no longer available in the United States, that asylum
seekers need permission from the Mexican government to seek
asylum, or that asylum seekers must apply for asylum at other ports
of entry.315 In the case of one of the individual plaintiffs, she was
threatened and falsely told that if she did not abandon her effort to
obtain asylum, she would lose custody of her children.316 The
government’s motion to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California was granted on November 21,
2017, dismissing all pending motions without prejudice, and
requiring Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the
government’s motion to dismiss be refiled.317 The case is currently
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California.318
While the significant decrease in southern border
apprehensions in FY 2017 is likely due in large part to the deterrent
effect created by the Border Security Executive Order and Secretary
Kelly’s comments about separating family units at the border, one
cannot help but wonder if CBP’s reported turn backs of asylum
seekers also contributed to the historically low apprehensions in FY
2017.
4. Limited Media Coverage of Border Security Enforcement Measures
Compared to the first Travel Ban, there was virtually no media
coverage of the three actions to implement the Border Security
Executive Order, described above.319 Between January 25, 2017 and
December 1, 2017, U.S. news outlets only published thirty-three
stories covering the blanket denial of parole and mass detention of
asylum seekers under the Border Security Executive Order.320

315. Id.
316. Declaration of Abigail Doe in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion, supra note 313,
at 4.
317. Challenging Customs and Border Protection’s Unlawful Practice of Turning Away
Asylum Seekers, AIC, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/chall
enging-customs-and-border-protections-unlawful-practice-turning-away-asylum-seek
ers [https://perma.cc/EA8C-Q3W3] (last visited June 20, 2018).
318. Case Profile: Al Otro Lado v. Kelly, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15991 [https://perma.cc/WW82-A
CQV] (last visited June 20, 2018).
319. See supra Part III.2.B.
320. ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/ (follow “Change Databases”
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Despite the serious harm caused by increased criminal
prosecution of first-time entrants for illegal entry—both individuals
and family units seeking asylum—news coverage of this issue was
relatively modest. Between April 11, 2017—the date of Attorney
General Sessions’ policy memorandum to federal prosecutors—and
December 1, 2017, U.S. news outlets published 392 stories on
criminal prosecution for illegal entry and illegal reentry.321 The
instances of CBP turning back asylum seekers also received limited
coverage in the press, with only 135 stories published in U.S. news
outlets between January 25, 2017 and December 1, 2017.322
IV. CONCLUSION
While there is no direct evidence of causation, evidence suggests
a correlation between media coverage, or lack thereof, and litigation
challenging the Trump Administration’s executive actions on
immigration. One key example of the link between increased media
coverage and positive impact on legal challenges to immigration
policy is the speed of legal proceedings. As noted above, the first
Travel Ban, implemented under intense and pervasive media
scrutiny, was halted almost immediately through a series of
nationwide injunctions, culminating in a published Ninth Circuit
decision upholding the TRO in Washington v. Trump.323 This decision
hyperlink; then expand “Global Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”;
then select “Use Selected Database”; then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then
type “Border Security” AND “Asylum” AND “Parole” in the first text box (quotations
included); then select from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date
range…”; then enter date range January 25, 2017–December 1, 2017; then select
“Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
321. Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”;
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Operation Streamline” AND
“Prosecution” AND “Illegal Entry” OR “Illegal Reentry” in the first text box
(quotations included); then select from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific
date range…”; then enter date range April 11, 2017–December 1, 2017; then select
“Search” button) (last visited June 20, 2018).
322. Id. (follow “Change Databases” hyperlink; then expand “Global
Newsstream” and check only “US Newsstream”; then select “Use Selected Database”;
then follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then type “Asylum” AND “Turn Back”
AND “Border Patrol” in the first text box (quotations not included); then select
from the “Publication date” dropdown “Specific date range…”; then enter date
range January 25, 2017–December 1, 2017; then select “Search” button) (last visited
June 20, 2018).
323. See supra Part III.A.2.
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was issued a mere two weeks after the Travel Ban was signed by
President Trump.324 By way of comparison, in Abdi v. Duke, the case
challenging the DHS’ blanket policy of denying detained asylum
seekers release on parole,325 District Court Judge Wolford granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction approximately two
months after it was filed with the court.326 Additionally, Judge
Wolford’s order was not a nationwide injunction and only applied to
class members detained at the Batavia Detention Facility near
Buffalo, New York.327
In the case of Al Otro Lado v. Duke, the class action litigation
challenging the rejection of asylum seekers by CBP and Border
Patrol agents, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on July 12,
2017.328 On November 21, 2017, Defendants’ motion to transfer
venue to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California was granted, dismissing all pending motions without
prejudice, and requiring Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss be refiled.329 The speed of
proceedings has a huge effect on the individuals impacted by the
specific executive order or agency action,330 and available evidence
suggests there is a correlation between the amount of media
coverage a case receives and the speed of judicial proceedings.331
Even more important is the complimentary role of investigative
journalism in identifying unlawful actions by DHS officials and
building the factual record supporting a legal cause of action
challenging DHS policies. A clear example of this is the investigative
reporting by the Houston Chronicle publishing the stories of Central
American parents who were separated from their children after
being apprehended by CBP agents and prosecuted for illegal
entry.332 This reporting by the Houston Chronicle was cited in the
December 11, 2017, formal complaint to the DHS Officer for Civil

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See id.
Abdi v. Duke, No. 17-cv-721 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017).
See supra Part III.C.1.
Id.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 312, at 1–3.
See supra Part III.C.3.
See supra Part III.A.3.
See id.
See supra Part III.C.2.
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Rights and Civil Liberties and DHS Inspector General, and provided
key factual background information in support of the complaint.333
Directly related to this is the role of media coverage in sparking
public outcry in support of or against a particular policy.334 The
widespread publication of the Alan Kurdi photo caused an
immediate shift in public attitude surrounding the Syrian Refugee
Crisis.335 Images of chaos at the airports and reports of lawful
permanent residents being denied entry into the U.S. sparked
nationwide protests and outrage in opposition to the Travel Ban.336
But if there is limited or no media coverage of the harm caused by
government action, the public will not be informed and thus will not
be able to demand action from our elected officials to right these
wrongs. To prevent ongoing and future abuses against
disenfranchised populations, such as immigrants and refugees, it is
critical that the press continues to give a voice to the voiceless and
illuminate injustice all around us.
The press, attorneys and the public have always played an
important role in holding government officials accountable.337 The
unprecedented actions of the Trump Administration have only
magnified the importance of these roles.338 The press must continue
to shine a light on actions by our government, attorneys must
continue to challenge unlawful actions by our government on behalf
of those who have been harmed, and the public must stay engaged
and express opposition to actions that threaten the most vulnerable
among us.

333.
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See id.
See supra Part III.B.2.
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